Evacuation and Shelter Guidance

Non-statutory guidance to complement *Emergency Preparedness* and *Emergency Response & Recovery*
How to use this guidance

The guidance should be used by emergency planners to develop scaleable and flexible plans that enable a co-ordinated multi-agency response in a crisis. It should be applied in conjunction with the non-statutory Emergency Response and Recovery and statutory Emergency Preparedness guidance. These documents are all available on the one-stop website for emergency planning practitioners – www.ukresilience.info. The guidance is designed to:

- inform on the roles and responsibilities relating to evacuation and shelter; and
- give more information on the key issues relating to evacuation and shelter, including those that have proved problematic in past exercises or real-world events.

It covers England and Wales only, though the key principles could be more widely applicable.

If you have any comments about the guidance, or any further ideas about how we might improve or add to it, please contact the Cabinet Office via the feedback form on the UK Resilience website.
Summary

• The context for evacuation and shelter guidance (paragraphs 1.1–1.2).

• This generic guidance is intended to help local responders develop a flexible ‘tool kit’ of evacuation and shelter measures (paragraph 1.2).

• It should help emergency planners to scope evacuation issues and to develop their own plans (paragraph 1.2).

• It will not provide planners with a blueprint – local plans need to be tailored to local circumstances (paragraph 1.3).

• It should be read in conjunction with the statutory guidance Emergency Preparedness and non-statutory guidance Emergency Response and Recovery which, together, set out the generic framework for civil protection (paragraph 1.4).

• The purpose of evacuation and shelter (paragraphs 1.5–1.7).
Introduction

1.1 Evacuation is not a new concept for emergency planners. Over the years there have been countless successful evacuations, but in recent years the context for evacuation planning has changed. With climate change and building taking place on flood plains, risks from flooding have increased. The threat of terrorism, meanwhile, has raised the possibility of scenarios unthinkable prior to the attacks of 11 September 2001. At the same time, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 has established a framework for multi-agency planning at the local and regional level. This has facilitated more systematic collective assessment, planning and response to the risks that we all face.

1.2 As a result, clarification and policy guidance on aspects of evacuation and shelter has been sought by practitioners. This guidance is intended to address these requirements by helping responders scope the issues and develop their own plans. It should allow local responders and other organisations to develop a flexible ‘tool kit’ of evacuation and shelter measures that can be used to respond to a wide range of scenarios proportionate to the risks their particular communities now face. It covers:

• the range of evacuation and shelter scenarios that planners should consider;
• the responsibilities of key organisations;
• legal and other considerations to be taken into account; and
• examples of good practice.

1.3 It will not, however, provide planners with a blueprint for their evacuation plans because these need to be tailored to their own local circumstances.

1.4 This guidance should be read in conjunction with the statutory guidance Emergency Preparedness and non-statutory guidance Emergency Response and Recovery which together set out the generic framework for civil protection. The guidance covers England and Wales, though its key principles are more widely applicable.

The purpose of evacuation and shelter

1.5 The purpose of evacuation is to move people, and where appropriate other living creatures, away from an actual or potential danger to a safer place. For this to happen safely there need to be plans not just for alerting people and moving them, but also plans to shelter and support them through to their eventual return and recovery. The need to provide humanitarian and other assistance, particularly to those with special requirements, requires careful consideration and planning. The diagram below shows the stages of evacuation and includes ‘dispersal’ – a form of evacuation in which people are simply directed to move away from a particular location without the need for temporary accommodation. The activity of warning and informing the public (see Chapter 4) should also run throughout the process.

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1 Organisations which respond to emergencies at a local level, for instance police, fire, ambulance and local authorities. A schedule of Category 1 and Category 2 responders is set out in Chapter 36, Part 1, schedule 1, of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, see: www.ukresilience.info.

1.6 In any decision to evacuate or not, the over-riding priority must be the safety of the public and emergency responders. Evacuation is by no means an easy option and may not be the safest option for the majority of those potentially at risk. Buildings can provide significant protection against most risks and the public may be safer seeking shelter in the nearest suitable building. Similarly, in the case of chemical, biological or radiological release, taking shelter would normally be the preferred option, at least initially. In the case of flooding, it may be safer to advise people to seek refuge in the upper storeys of a building rather than run the risk of being overcome by the flood waters. So evacuation should not automatically be adopted as the best measure.

1.7 This guidance emphasises that, as well as planning for evacuation, responder organisations need to develop robust plans for alternative public protection measures, including supporting people to ‘go in, stay in, tune in’, and for communicating to the public what they should do. Supporting dependent individuals in their homes or offices can present serious challenges, especially in respect of meeting their basic needs (see Chapter 3 of this guidance).

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3 Go inside a safe building, stay inside until you are advised to do otherwise and tune in to local radio and TV for more information. More information for the public on responding to emergencies is available at: www.preparingforemergencies.gov.uk. See also Chapter 6 of this guidance.
Chapter 2
Flexible risk-based planning

Summary

- Risk assessment – the first step in emergency/business continuity planning for evacuation and shelter (paragraphs 2.1–2.2).

- Multi-agency and regional planning should create flexible plans capable of operation both on a small scale and on a larger scale when necessary (paragraphs 2.3–2.5).

- Using Geographical Information Systems (GIS) for evacuation planning (paragraphs 2.6–2.7).

- Decisions to evacuate should take into account the risks of evacuation and alternative forms of civil protection (paragraph 2.8).

- Different scales of evacuation (paragraph 2.9).

- The main types of risk which might give rise to large-scale evacuation and/or shelter: major flooding, acts of terrorism, incidents involving radiation and chemical release and serious transport failures (paragraphs 2.10–2.16).

- Generic and site-specific plans should be developed for different types of evacuation/shelter as appropriate. Generic plans should cover: different notice periods for evacuation (short notice, longer notice and no notice) and alerting people to the dangers of spontaneous evacuation (paragraphs 2.17–2.22).

- Sheltering from a disruptive event may be the best and safest option in many scenarios (paragraphs 2.23–2.24).

- Dispersal, where people are directed away from a real or perceived threat (paragraph 2.25).

- Timescales and taking self-evacuation into consideration (paragraphs 2.26–2.29).

- Category 1 responders are required by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to maintain and exercise plans (paragraph 2.30).

- Exercising elements of evacuation plans and using table-top or discussion-based exercises (paragraph 2.31).

- Lessons identified should be captured through a formalised process. A report on implementation of recommendations should be produced within 12 months of an exercise taking place (paragraphs 2.32–2.34).
Introduction

2.1 Risk-based planning is at the heart of the government’s approach to civil contingencies. It is essential that evacuation and shelter planning and capabilities are both tailored and proportionate to the risks faced by a community, as identified in the local Community Risk Register (CRR) or regional/Wales Risk Assessment. Local and regional/Wales Risk Assessment Guidance is issued annually and covers generic risks that could give rise to evacuation and shelter.\(^4\) A proportionate and scalable risk-based approach includes developing emergency plans for both evacuation and supporting people sheltering in homes and workplaces during an incident.

2.2 With many organisations and resources involved in facilitating evacuation and shelter, it is essential that issues are thought through, agreed and tested in advance. However, with the exception of some locations where there are particular site-specific risks (see paragraph 2.19), it is not practical or realistic to develop detailed plans in advance for every possible scenario. Instead, planning needs to establish a series of flexible pre-planned options that can be combined to provide a customised response to suit the circumstances of an individual situation (for more detail see paragraphs 2.17–2.28).

Multi-agency co-operation

2.3 Multi-agency co-operation is a guiding principle of emergency preparedness, and evacuation planning is no exception. Evacuation planning and exercising should be bespoke to local risks and circumstances and will require the involvement of many different organisations. It is therefore primarily an issue for local response organisations and Local Resilience Forums (LRFs).\(^5\) LRFs need to consider how best to structure their evacuation planning activities. In some cases, much of the detailed planning activity will be co-ordinated at a sub-LRF level, for example on a city or district basis. LRFs may wish to establish sub-groups to focus specifically on evacuation and shelter issues. We recommend that LRFs consider the involvement of a welfare group and include voluntary organisations so that arrangements for supporting people are integral to their plans.\(^6\) Representatives from the business community (especially those responsible for key single-site locations) and Category 2 responders providing essential services should be involved to ensure effective co-ordination with their evacuation planning. In addition the LRF should agree a lead agency for evacuation and shelter planning – generally this will be the police, the fire and rescue service or the local authority.

2.4 Regional co-ordination offers practical and logistical benefits for larger evacuation and sheltering scenarios. Regional Resilience Forums (RRFs)\(^7\) can play a crucial role in looking at planning issues that extend beyond an individual LRF area. In Wales, the Wales Resilience Forum (WRF) will fulfil the same role, using the multi-agency Wales Resilience Partnership Team to take forward specific planning issues. There are three broad areas in which we envisage RRFs/the WRF will play a key role:

- **Risks requiring co-ordinated planning**
  on a region-wide basis for an effective response. This might be because:
  - the area affected by a risk crosses LRF boundaries (eg major coastal flooding); and/or

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\(^4\) This means assessing the evacuation and shelter implications of the risks, identifying capability gaps, working out what is required to fill the gap and prioritising this work against other risk-reduction measures. For full details of the risk assessment process, see *Emergency Preparedness*, Chapter 4.

\(^5\) These groups, which were introduced by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, now provide the principle mechanism for developing and agreeing multi-agency plans.

\(^6\) *Emergency Preparedness*, Chapter 2, paragraphs 2.59–2.63 (available at: [www.ukresilience.info](http://www.ukresilience.info)) explains the role and responsibilities of an LRF sub-group.

\(^7\) For full details on the role of the RRFs and Regional Media Emergency Forums respectively, see *Emergency Preparedness*, Chapter 17 and *Emergency Response and Recovery*, Chapter 6.
– large numbers of people would need to be evacuated or dispersed to locations outside the affected LRFs’ boundaries; and/or;
– of the magnitude of potential social, economic or community impacts on the sub-region or region.

• **Generic resources** where value can be added by co-ordinating, pooling or tracking resources on a region-wide basis. This might include maintaining a single regional pool or call-off contracts for items such as perishable materials that often have to be replaced before they are used. Mutual aid can often be the quickest solution where additional resources are required at short notice. LRFs/RRFs/the WRF should promote the establishment of mutual aid arrangements within their region and across regional boundaries.

• **Sharing best practice** and **promoting consistency** between and among local responders and businesses/essential services.

2.5 **RRFs/the WRF** will need to consider – in conjunction with their constituent LRFs – the extent of their evacuation and shelter planning role in the light of their regional risk assessment and taking into account the particular demographic, economic, geographic and infrastructure characteristics of their region. RRFs will also need to consider with LRFs the extent to which the regional resilience tier will be expected to provide co-ordination in an emergency and ensure arrangements for this are reflected in local evacuation and shelter plans. In Wales, the WRF will need to consider this issue with the four LRFs.

Using Geographical Information Systems (GIS) for risk-based planning

2.6 Most emergencies have a strong geographical dimension, since their location and spread will determine their impacts and how they should be managed. Consequently many local and regional responders have found that Geographical Information Systems (GIS) provide a valuable tool both in planning for, responding to, and recovering from incidents that may require evacuation and shelter. GIS can:

• assist emergency managers to identify and take account of demographic aspects of an emergency (such as its location, extent, consequences, and who will be affected); and

• allow geographical information from multiple sources and agencies to be integrated to provide an informed response.

2.7 Access to data of an appropriate quality is critical to the successful application of GIS, and it is also extremely important that data can be moved across both geographical and organisational boundaries. LRFs should, wherever possible, ensure that data is shared between neighbouring areas to maximise the regional benefits of such systems, bearing in mind of course that emergencies will not respect administrative boundaries on the ground. Further details are available in the Cabinet Office publication, *A Guide to GIS Applications*.8

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8 See: www.ukresilience.info/publications/index.shtm.
Risk assessment

2.8 The evacuation process carries with it inherent risks. Decisions to evacuate need to be based on a proper assessment of all the risks and the availability of alternative public protection measures. Often this will have to be a dynamic assessment, undertaken as events on the ground are developing. It will almost always be improved by planning and work done in advance.

Scale

2.9 As the numbers of people likely to be involved in an evacuation will vary hugely between different parts of the country depending on demographic and social factors, we have defined different scales of evacuation in terms of the response arrangements that would be needed to support them (see Annex 2A for definitions). This guidance focuses on the issues relating to large-scale evacuations because these generally present the greatest challenge. This does not mean that scenarios giving rise to mass evacuations, such as that seen in the US in 2005 following Hurricane Katrina, are thought to be a strong possibility; indeed for most areas there are very few risks of a sufficiently significant likelihood that could cause evacuation on such a scale.

Planning for large-scale evacuation

2.10 As discussed above, priorities for evacuation planning should be determined on the basis of local and regional risks rather than crudely based on the largest conceivable number of evacuees. However, emergency planners have sought clarification on the maximum numbers of people they may feasibly need to evacuate at one time, and the circumstances in which large-scale evacuation could take place. The larger evacuation scenarios identified in the national risk assessment process are set out below. This is by means of general illustration only, to help emergency planners assess the evacuation and shelter implications of their own local risk assessments which will reflect local population densities, geographic factors and other variations.

Major flooding

2.11 Some extreme flooding scenarios, for example a major east coast tidal flood, could have the potential to affect between tens and hundreds of thousands of people. Such an event occurred in 1953 when the east coast of England suffered major coastal flooding with over 32,000 people being evacuated. With the exception of a few coastal cities that are particularly vulnerable, large-scale flooding is likely to be spread out geographically so extensive evacuation is likely to be the product of a series of evacuations from different locations. As mentioned in paragraph 1.6, the unpredictability of flooding events means it may be a safer option to encourage people to remain indoors on upper floors, rather than risk being caught in fast-moving waters.

Box 2.1: Using GIS mapping

Bristol City local authority used GIS mapping data in June 2006 to inform its emergency response to the discovery of a suspected World War Two bomb. First of all, the total population of the area that was potentially affected (10,500 residents and over 55,000 business workers) was established. To focus in on potentially vulnerable groups and those with specific requirements, this demographic information was further broken down, for example to show the number and geographical distribution of residents over the age of 65. Maps produced with the GIS were distributed by the authority to children’s and adult community care services to enable them to identify and help all those who might need special care and assistance. Three hundred shops and a number of office blocks in the immediate vicinity were successfully evacuated and closed. The army bomb disposal unit subsequently discovered that the suspect object was not an unexploded device.
Where warning times are available to evacuate in advance, planners should generally assume that these are likely to be as follows (though there will be individual cases where warning times could be shorter):

- detected weakness in flood defence (i.e. a breach): 0 to 1 hour; and

- forecast surge that overtops flood defences: up to 8 hours, though for fluvial (river) flooding, forecasts can sometimes allow warnings to be issued up to 48 hours in advance.\(^9\)

More information on flooding can be found at paragraphs 3.30–3.32.

**Industrial accidents**

Industrial accidents may result in explosions that could necessitate evacuating the surrounding area and major toxic chemical or radiation release covering a large geographical area. For industrial sites where there are major hazards site-specific planning should already be in place.\(^{10}\)

**Acts of terrorism**

In most of the major terrorist scenarios that we have analysed the preferred option would be for the majority of people to shelter with only those in the immediate vicinity of an attack being dispersed. Indeed in some cases, particularly where chemical or biological contaminants are involved, evacuation would be highly dangerous and arrangements would be needed to dissuade people from spontaneously evacuating.\(^{11}\) Further details on radiological attack are below. Large-scale evacuation scenarios could arise if there were multiple attacks that rendered a large area unsafe. Potentially hundreds of thousands of people could require evacuation or sheltering across a region or major urban area. In the event of a credible warning about an imminent attack, widespread evacuation may be appropriate if evacuation could be carried out without exposing the public to increased risk.

**Radiation**

In most cases following a release of radiological material the best advice is to shelter indoors, with the doors and windows closed, until notified that the threat has passed or the call comes to evacuate.\(^{12}\) If an evacuation is decided upon, it needs to be conducted in a controlled, systematic way in order to minimise potential exposure. In the event of a significant radiological dispersal device (or dirty bomb) in a densely populated area, up to tens of thousands of people may require evacuation, or more if an event took place where such numbers of people had congregated (e.g. an open-air concert).

**Transport failures**

A major power failure or terrorist attacks affecting the public transport system could result in a large number of people requiring temporary shelter or alternative transport arrangements to help them to disperse or return to their homes or place of work. The scale of shelter required will depend on the nature and use of the transport system concerned. For example, in cities like London where there is a high dependency on public transport to commute long distances, planning needs to address scenarios in which people become stranded and require temporary shelter or alternative transport. Other examples (posing different logistical challenges) would be major gridlock or motorists stranded because of severe weather.

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\(^9\) The Met Office and Environment Agency issue severe weather/flooding warnings.

\(^{10}\) See sections 2.19–2.21 of this guidance for further information.

\(^{11}\) See the Home Office guidance *The Release of CBRN Substances or Material – Guidance for Local Authorities* for further information, available on: [www.ukresilience.info/emergencies/cbrn_docs/homeoffice](http://www.ukresilience.info/emergencies/cbrn_docs/homeoffice).

Flexible and scaleable framework for evacuation and shelter planning

2.17 As the above paragraphs illustrate, the range of scenarios in which evacuation and sheltering may be needed is diverse. Some of the key factors which can be used by planners to address these are outlined below.

Generic evacuation planning

2.18 Flexible generic evacuation and shelter plans are needed for events that are not location-specific and may occur at little or no notice. The scale of such plans should be proportionate to local risks. They should also be capable of being linked to neighbouring plans in the event of a larger scale or cross-boundary incident. The aim should be to prepare a tool kit of options that can be combined and adapted to suit specific circumstances.

Site-specific planning

2.19 Evacuation and shelter plans are often tailored to significant risks that are location specific. As well as drawing on the components of generic planning outlined above, planners should:

• consider the particular logistical challenges that would be posed in evacuating or supporting people sheltering in that location;

• establish effective mechanisms for warning and informing the public in the vicinity of the site or location;

• consider establishing and maintaining public awareness strategies in the area concerned; and

• work closely with employers in the area affected to ensure that suitable arrangements are in place.

2.20 Local authorities will also need to take account of these plans in the business continuity advice they provide to organisations in the area. Businesses should be ready to provide information on their employees to a casualty bureau in an emergency, so that evacuees can be accounted for.

2.21 Local and regional/Wales risk assessments can be used to identify those situations for which specific evacuation plans are likely to be required. These may include:

• locations and events where large numbers of people congregate, such as major sporting events or shopping centres;

• industrial sites;

• high-risk flooding zones (based on Environment Agency (EA) advice) and

• any specific site or location that may be a particular target for terrorists given its economic, political, social or symbolic nature.

Box 2.2: Use of zoning maps

In addition to using GIS systems (see Box 2.1), the use of ‘zoning maps’ can be very helpful in emergency planning and management. By dividing a geographical area into zones and disseminating the ‘zoning maps’ across multi-agency stakeholders, disruptive events can be managed more effectively.

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13 As an example of good practice, Manchester City Council’s zoning map, developed in conjunction with the Greater Manchester Police, British Transport Police, Greater Manchester Fire Service and Greater Manchester Ambulance Service NHS Trust, can be found at: [www.manchester.gov.uk/emergency/map.htm](http://www.manchester.gov.uk/emergency/map.htm).

14 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 requires local authorities to provide advice and assistance to those undertaking commercial activities and to voluntary organisations in relation to business continuity management (BCM) in the event of emergencies. [Emergency Preparedness](#), Chapter 8, provides more information.

15 Flood risk areas can be found on the Environment Agency website at: [www.environment-agency.gov.uk](http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk).
The police, particularly the Counter Terrorism Security Advisors in each force, can provide advice to local emergency planners on particular sites that may be at risk. Generic security advice is available from the Security Service (MI5) website, and the national UK threat levels are kept updated on the UK Intelligence Community Online site.

2.22 Evacuation modelling is expensive but for site-specific plans and high-risk areas it can be valuable in understanding the true impact of an event. For example, inundation maps from flood models have led to flood-specific evacuation plans being prepared in certain urban areas due to the highly complex patterns of rising waters blocking normal evacuation routes.

Sheltering

2.23 Sheltering from an event may be undertaken either in situ (eg within the home or workplace) or following an evacuation to a designated local authority rest centre (eg a school or leisure centre, see paragraph 3.4).

2.24 In many cases a combined response may be required, with in situ sheltering recommended for some areas (ie those in the possible path of contamination), and evacuation recommended for areas which have more time before the danger (eg flooding) materialises. Communicating this type of combined response to the public is particularly challenging.

Dispersal

2.25 Dispersal is a form of evacuation in which people are simply directed away from the real or perceived source of danger. Whilst any evacuation is likely to include some dispersal, this guidance focuses instead on managed evacuation, given it presents the greater challenge for planners and responders and most issues arising from it are common to dispersal.

Timescales

2.26 Planners should consider the different timescales needed for evacuation and shelter and the possibility that people might self-evacuate. The latter could include cases where the public are advised to shelter in situ, or ‘go in, stay in, tune in’. As a result, planners need to develop communication strategies to encourage people not to endanger themselves or others by spontaneously evacuating. Where sheltering in situ is advised, shelters and other capabilities should ideally be put on stand by, in case people still evacuate against advice. It helps if people can be given an indication, early on, of how long they will need to shelter.

Short notice before an event

2.27 The scale of evacuation and/or shelter initiated will be affected by the amount of time available. In ‘sudden impact’ events, the priority will be to provide maximum protection to the public. This may mean removing those most at risk (because of their location or personal circumstances) and encouraging those who are less vulnerable to find appropriate shelter in their immediate vicinity. The movement of those people most at risk may be done in a managed way (ie through evacuation procedures) or through dispersal.

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16 The National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) works to the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and provides a co-ordinating role for the police service in regard to counter terrorism and protective security.

Longer notice before an event

2.28 This allows time to implement a specific plan that adequately manages the risks associated with displacing large numbers of people. It may be applicable for slow-developing ‘rising-tide’ scenarios and where specific prior intelligence is available. This might include phased evacuation to allow the potential risks of evacuation and resource implications to be more effectively managed (for example, evacuating those individuals or areas most at risk first). Experience from the US also suggests that very large evacuations may require key worker households to be evacuated first so that the key workers are able to assist fully with the evacuation.\(^{18}\)

After an event

2.29 Assessments will first need to be made of the risks of sheltering (either in situ or in reception centres) versus evacuating. Where evacuation is necessary, the initial focus will normally be on evacuating those assessed to be in immediate danger or particularly vulnerable. Plans should also include supporting people who need to be decontaminated prior to evacuation and can be expected to have additional welfare needs such as adequate warm clothing, footwear etc. For some disruptive events, such as major flooding or chemical release, people may be displaced for months (and possibly years).

Box 2.3: Evacuating for Hurricane Rita

In the US in 2005, an estimated three million residents were evacuated in little more than two days in advance of Hurricane Rita. The evacuation took place in a staggered sequence. Hospitals and nursing homes were a priority for the evacuation planners, with patients being systematically transferred to other centres outside of the assessed danger zone. Evacuation staggered over longer time frames should normally help guard against gridlock, accidents and risk to life. That said, the Hurricane Rita evacuation still resulted in significant vehicular traffic congestion (especially due to over-reliance on cars), and around 100 people died as it progressed, mainly from hypertension, heat exhaustion, heart attacks, epilepsy, vehicle fires and motor accidents.\(^{19}\)

Exercising evacuation plans

2.30 Exercising and training is a key element of risk-based planning. Category 1 responders have a duty to maintain and exercise their plans under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Category 2 responders are obliged to co-operate in this. The regulations also require provisions for the training of staff and other persons to be included in plans.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{18}\) Police, fire, and ambulance personnel and others working for first responder organisations and essential service providers. For an official ‘lessons learned’ account from Hurricane Katrina, see www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.


\(^{20}\) See *Emergency Preparedness*, Chapter 5.
2.31 Whilst full-scale evacuation exercises may present difficulties, components of plans can be exercised in full. Table-top or discussion-based exercises can also take place, which are particularly useful for practising scaling up plans. In both cases, as wide a range of organisations as possible should be involved, without placing undue burden on them. Exercise programmes should, where possible, seek to address recovery as well as response issues and, over time, test the full range of capabilities/responders who might be involved in a range of evacuation scenarios. Peer review by other planners or teams is an important method of checking the quality of planning and should not require significant resources.

2.32 It is essential that lessons identified from exercises, reviews and actual events are captured, recorded and implemented through a formal review process. Within 12 months of an exercise, an implementation report should be produced indicating which of the post-exercise report’s recommendations have been carried out and how.21

2.33 Plans should be shared as widely as possible within the emergency planning community (eg through local and regional resilience forums) to encourage best practice.22

Box 2.4: Exercise Triton

In June 2004 the EA ran a major exercise ‘Triton’, jointly sponsored by the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG). Over 60 organisations and agencies took part nationally, regionally and locally. The exercise tested response procedures, including evacuation, for very large-scale flooding in England and Wales. An action plan was agreed to strengthen capabilities in the light of the exercise.

2.34 Each individual organisation or agency is responsible for any training required to enable them to fulfil their roles and responsibilities. Training should recognise both the individual’s roles and responsibilities within their own organisation, and how this fits into the multi-agency reality of major evacuation or shelter scenarios. The training of incident commanders and their involvement in multi-agency exercising is particularly important given their role in implementing evacuation and shelter plans.

21 Details of this process are available at: www.ukresilience.info/preparedness/exercises.

22 Where possible, copies of plans should be sent to The Librarian, The Emergency Planning College, The Hawkhills, Easingwold, York, Y061 3EG.
Summary

• Evacuation and shelter planning should focus on supporting the public throughout the incident, until they return home (paragraph 3.1).

• Planners need to take into account:
  – transporting people and traffic management (paragraph 3.2);
  – shelter and rest centre accommodation (paragraphs 3.3–3.9);
  – supporting people sheltering in situ (paragraphs 3.10–3.12);
  – assisting groups with specific needs (paragraphs 3.13–3.20);
  – developing a multi-agency crime prevention strategy (paragraphs 3.21–3.23);
  – pets and livestock (paragraphs 3.24–3.26);
  – business continuity (paragraphs 3.27–3.28);
  – protecting items of cultural interest and high value (paragraph 3.29); and
  – special considerations for flooding (paragraphs 3.30–3.32), chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN)/hazardous materials (paragraphs 3.33–3.35) and pandemic flu (paragraph 3.36).

• Consideration of actions that can be taken before, during and after an emergency situation to promote return and recovery should be central to evacuation planning (paragraphs 3.37–3.39).

• Providing support for British nationals and their families evacuated from overseas (paragraph 3.40).
Introduction

3.1 Planning should not focus exclusively on the initial phase of evacuation. To be successful, it must aim to support the public throughout the incident until they have safely returned home.

Transport

3.2 Transport planning, including traffic management and modelling, is critical. Evacuation planners need to work closely with transport colleagues, including those in the private sector, to develop workable joined-up plans. The following key points should be considered:

- Understanding the capacity of the strategic routes away from the affected area is central to assessing how many people it is feasible to transport within the time available.
- Evacuation planning should aim to look at potential choke points and how most effective use can be made of the transport infrastructure available, including the capacity of local public transport and call-off contracts with other providers. Urban traffic management and control systems and CCTV may assist in identifying choke points and evacuation routes.
- Transport hubs (eg main railways or bus stations) are likely to play an important role in evacuation (both at the embarkation/marshalling and disembarkation stages). However, planners must take into account that the hubs may themselves be out of action because of the implications of the incident (eg because they are flooded) or because of its security implications (eg because they present a soft target to a terrorist).
- Beyond those transport schemes for which local authorities are directly responsible, local authorities and planners should also engage with air and rail network owners and other operators to inform evacuation planning.
- Planning should consider the development of pre-planned arrangements for flexible road signage to facilitate the evacuation. If messages are developed that are specific for the evacuation (eg on variable message systems that are either set from Police Control Centres for local incidents or the National Traffic Control Centre for strategic diversion signing), then planners should consult with communications experts to ensure that they do not cause unnecessary alarm or panic.
- The carrying of bulky luggage (and in some cases, any luggage) should be discouraged.
- Planning should generally discourage the use of private cars given the congestion that they are likely to cause.
- Planning will need to cater for those who cannot access a car or travel on foot, a significant proportion of whom can be expected to have particular vulnerabilities and may require assisted evacuation, specialised equipment and care.
- Planning also needs to identify transport routes for emergency services to get to the scene of an incident.
- Planning for evacuation by bus, coach or public transport can also help to avoid congestion problems.
- Planning to make use of local authorities’ homeschool transport and social care transport may be helpful.
- Contractual and practical arrangements so that public transport workers can assist in an evacuation should be thought through, including health and safety issues (see paragraph 5.32).
- Emergency planners should cross-check their evacuation plans with those of their adjacent authorities to ensure that they do not all rely on the same transport routes or companies.

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23 As an example, the ten local authorities in Manchester have jointly agreed a call-off contract with a commercial provider of transport and accommodation (whose main business is in providing rail and airline replacement services) for use in the event of an emergency.

24 See paragraph 5.29.
• For flood-prone areas, transport planning will also need to take account of the flood risks to transport infrastructure.

• Part of local authorities’ responsibilities in organising temporary shelter must be to help people get to and from the emergency shelter (see paragraph 5.11).

• Health and safety legislation applies during the transportation of people in the event of an evacuation.25

• Carriers should be identified who are qualified and insured to transport vulnerable groups such as the elderly or those with medical conditions.

• Local authorities should agree with other key stakeholders, especially the police, on who pays for the transportation of people to shelters.26

• Planning should also address issues such as the additional demand for petrol, car parking at shelters and rapid clearance of blockages.

• Warning and informing the public (see Chapter 4) needs to be intrinsic to all evacuation planning. As well as awareness-raising prior to an evacuation, continued advice needs to be given during an incident, both updating evacuees on the developing situation and giving information on transport issues such as avoiding evacuation areas and potential hazards (eg down wind plumes in chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incidents).

Shelter

3.3 For many people rest centre accommodation will be their last resort and indeed many will seek lodging with family and friends. Wherever possible this should be encouraged; pre-existing support networks will generally offer more social, emotional, and practical support than can be provided in a rest centre. Emergency planners may consider what practical arrangements can be put in place to help people find lodgings within the community or with family and friends further afield (for example, with the help of community networks, local radio stations and noticeboards at shelters). Those leaving shelters should be asked to register their onward destination.

3.4 Co-ordination of rest centre accommodation, as well as arrangements to get people to the rest centre, is a local authority responsibility. Arrangements will in many cases be well established.27 Examples of accommodation used for rest centres by local authorities include universities, schools, residential colleges, night-clubs and sports facilities/arenas.

3.5 In some cases where few people remain to be sheltered and these individuals do not have specific needs, it may be more cost-effective to use hotels rather than open rest centre accommodation. Local authorities could either keep lists of hotels in the local vicinity that can be used for such a purpose, or arrange call-off contracts with commercial providers of accommodation. However, planners should bear in mind that it may be more difficult to support vulnerable community members in this type of accommodation. Evacuation planning will need to look at the distribution of rest centre sites and establish that:

• there is sufficient shelter capacity available outside the area likely to be evacuated and that it is sustainable for a suitable period of time;

• local authority registration forms are ready and responsibilities for registration are pre-agreed;28

• lines of communication between rest centres and key players (such as any casualty bureaux and voluntary organisations) are agreed and clearly set out;

• the centres are accessible (in the context of the evacuation scenarios being considered) for the public, suppliers and others;

25 See paragraphs 6.17–6.20 for further information on health and safety legislation.

26 See paragraphs 5.11–5.12 for further information.

27 Emergency Response and Recovery, Chapter 5.

28 As an example, see the evacuee registration system of Chelmsford Local Authority: www.chelmsford.gov.uk/index.cfm?articleid=10012.
• arrangements are in place for supporting people physically, particularly in relation to arrangements to keep them fully informed;
• roles and contributions of all the organisations involved including Primary Care Trusts, voluntary sector etc are agreed and understood;
• rest centre staff are trained and training is up to date;  
• there is a centralised system in place to co-ordinate allocation of the appropriate number of evacuees to and between rest centres, to prevent overcrowding (school children should be kept together in the care of their teachers until the last child is reunited with its parents);
• medical and counselling assistance is set up as soon as possible (see Box 3.2);
• in the case of prolonged shelter and displacement, arrangements for schooling children are in place;
• building health and safety regulations are followed; and
• the centres have disabled access.  

3.6 Of course rest centres can themselves become at risk and therefore require their own business continuity and evacuation plans. Beyond rest centres that provide temporary accommodation for evacuees and homeless survivors, survivor reception centres, family and friends reception centres and assistance centres may be established that provide practical and emotional support to survivors of incidents, their families and friends. 

3.7 The logistical challenges of providing effective sheltering facilities should not be underestimated. Facilities may need to include washing, feeding, childcare and medical (including triage) arrangements, as well as meeting the special needs of evacuees, including their mobility and cultural needs. Large commercial venues are likely already to have extensive security, catering and other arrangements which may prove valuable for local authorities in running a rest centre. Administrative arrangements to track and connect individuals and families are essential, and as the bullet points above mention, rest centres will need to pass registration information to the police as soon as possible, initially for the casualty bureau, and potentially for witness statements. In order to account for all evacuees, it is important to encourage those leaving reception or rest centres to register their intended destination on departure.

3.8 Plans for reception/assistance centres and shelters should consider the need for children (see paragraph 6.13) and vulnerable adults to be safeguarded from harm. Policies should be in place on who will care for children if their parents are not present. Plans for children and vulnerable adults at reception/assistance centres and shelters should avoid, where possible, these groups being cared for by someone who has not been subject to a Criminal Record Bureau (CRB) check working without supervision. Carers who have been CRB checked and judged suitable to work with children could be found among local staff, for example, from teachers, other school staff, childcare and social workers.

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29 Manchester provides a training and information video for rest centre managers and staff: www.manchester.gov.uk/emergency/publications.htm.
30 This is required under the Disability Discrimination Act 2005.
31 Further guidance on these centres can be found in Emergency Response and Recovery Chapter 5, and in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) Humanitarian Assistance Guidance, which will be available via the UK Resilience website: www.ukresilience.info.
32 Hygiene requirements need to be considered; see: www.foodstandards.gov.uk/aboutus/publications/industry_guides.
33 Emergency Response and Recovery, paragraph 5.36.
34 Further information on CRB checks can be found at: www.crb.gov.uk.
3.9 Like all evacuation planning, shelter plans should be scaleable and flexible, with a tool kit of options that can be implemented in response to the scenario, including pre-prepared service level agreements and supply contracts. Evacuation planners should consider the possibility of contractors and suppliers getting caught up in the evacuation and not being able to fulfil pre-arranged supply contracts. They should also consider the need and value of having a ‘brokerage centre’ for the procurement of goods and services and the deployment of personnel and equipment.

Box 3.1: Using voluntary sector capabilities for shelter

During the Boscastle flash floods of August 2004, the local authority had a service level agreement with the Women’s Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS) to manage its rest centres. Once a suitably sized centre that was still accessible had been identified, centre staff, who had received training from WRVS, began to prepare the site. Meanwhile WRVS volunteers held back by the flood tuned in to local radio to determine which centre to attend. A country-wide network and exercise policy provides WRVS with the flexibility it requires to handle this and larger incidents.

3.10 Consideration needs to be given to supporting people sheltering in situ where this is deemed to be the safest option. The public may require practical and emotional support for sheltering, but the logistical arrangements for getting this to them will present very different challenges from those of evacuation. It is important that these challenges are also planned for, to avoid the public putting themselves at risk by leaving their place of shelter to access fresh supplies or other forms of assistance. This danger may be particularly acute in CBRN scenarios.

3.11 The most effective way in which people can shelter depends on the scenario. The Preparing for Emergencies website and booklet provide information for the public on sheltering in situ, whether at home or elsewhere (eg at school or at work). The Security Service publication Protecting Against Terrorism also provides useful guidance on evacuating from premises/buildings because of a terrorist incident. The latter outlines some of the characteristics of the most ‘protected spaces’ at home or in the workplace.

3.12 Given that a large number of people may be sheltering at home or in their workplace in the event of a major emergency, local authorities should include plans for distributing food and water to communities in the event that the people have to shelter in situ for prolonged periods. This may include utilising CBRN capabilities (ie of the Fire and Rescue Service) to distribute any essential supplies necessary until ‘hot zones’ are evacuated. The voluntary and community sector is likely to play an important role (though not within a CBRN environment) particularly in assisting vulnerable people (see below).

Groups with specific needs

3.13 Being evacuated can be a disturbing experience for all involved. For a significant proportion of people the experience can be potentially very serious because it removes them from established support mechanisms or exposes particular vulnerabilities. Evacuation planning should establish in advance how these individuals will be identified and assisted so that in an evacuation situation they are not exposed to excessive risk.

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36 See: www.MI5.gov.uk.
3.14 Collection and sharing of information on groups or individuals with specific needs in a local area is not a simple task. That said, there are relatively straightforward mechanisms by which the process can be made easier through the establishment of information-sharing protocols, a clear understanding of the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 and Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the maintenance of up to date lists of groups with specific needs or those organisations that may care for/represent them (see also paragraph 6.23).

3.15 As a starting point, each LRF should establish who, within their area, holds information identifying vulnerable individuals and a mechanism for calling on these lists in an emergency. The table at Annex 3A shows the potential range of vulnerable people with specific needs within a local area and the organisation/agencies that may hold information on them. Clearly who is vulnerable will depend on the scenario, and the table is not intended to be exhaustive. Planning should define what special requirements these people have to allow them to shelter at home, when being moved (e.g., any special vehicles/insurance required) and when being given shelter (e.g., wheelchairs, medicine etc). See also paragraph 5.8.

3.16 There are other individuals or groups that are not vulnerable but may require special care and attention. Evacuation planners need to consider their potential special requirements. Any emergency in the UK is likely to involve a number of different faith, religious, cultural and ethnic minority communities. These could be, for example, dietary (e.g., kosher food), cultural (e.g., unisex facilities) or religious (e.g., need for prayer facilities). On a similar note, the movement of people from one part of the country to another may create community tensions. The police and local authority should undertake a community impact assessment to inform any decision to move large groups of people to different communities.

3.17 Whilst many of the vulnerable individuals concerned will be known to existing service providers there will be others who for a variety of reasons are not – including visitors to the area. Contingency arrangements are needed to ensure they are not overlooked.

3.18 The numbers of vulnerable people needing local authority support may be increased in an evacuation situation as individuals may have discharged themselves, or been discharged from hospital early. Similarly, the number of vulnerable people requiring health support may be increased in an evacuation situation because their health has suffered as a result of the evacuation, or they require medical support that they would usually self-administer or receive through home-help/social services. Both local authority and health evacuation planners need to be aware of these competing pressures. The guiding principle should be that the organisation with primary responsibility for supporting particular needs or vulnerabilities will lead on planning to address those needs (although there may be cases where the LRF decides to do otherwise for logistical reasons).

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37 Computerised mapping capabilities may also be used to help compile and store an information picture on vulnerable residents, see paragraphs 2.6–2.7 and Box 2.1 of this guidance.

38 See Chapter 4 of this guidance on communications, and paragraphs 3.3–3.9 on shelter.

3.19 This is an area where the voluntary and community sector often plays a significant role. The planning process should identify and agree in advance the extent of voluntary sector involvement and how they will work with the lead agencies.

3.20 Similar considerations apply when people are asked to shelter in situ until a risk has passed. Emergency planning should establish arrangements to identify those with particular vulnerabilities and arrangements to assist them by providing them with support or by making early arrangements to remove them to a more suitable location.

**Developing a multi-agency crime prevention strategy**

3.21 Convincing the public that their property will be safeguarded in their absence can be essential in persuading them to evacuate in an emergency. As paragraph 5.6 points out, however, plans should assume limited resources within the police to provide for the protection of vacated homes and businesses. Evacuation plans should therefore incorporate plans for law and order. These might include:

- developing a multi-agency crime prevention strategy;
- communication strategies both to reassure homeowners and to deter potential lawbreakers (including during the return and recovery stages);
- highly visible enforcement strategies such as police stop checks to provide public reassurance; and
- making full use of other resources in the area that might supplement the police’s activities eg security firms employed by local businesses, community groups etc.

3.22 Information to the public should be clear on securing their homes as they evacuate and how to indicate to emergency services that a building is fully vacated. Contracts with private firms who provide security to premises during normal circumstances may not be valid during a crisis. Any contracts put in place with private firms to provide security during an emergency need to take into consideration the fact that such firms may themselves be asked by police to evacuate.

3.23 The local authority, in consultation with the police, should give consideration at the planning stage to implementing scene access control arrangements to allow escorted access through the outer cordon to non-emergency service personnel whose presence is required. To facilitate this, a Scene Access Control Centre should be established outside the outer cordon as part of Bronze Command. The Centre, which will be under police command, must be clearly identifiable to those wishing to gain entry and, if necessary, an approach route must be established and signposted.

**Pets and livestock**

3.24 It should be assumed that many people will resist any advice to leave pets and sometimes livestock behind, and that a small percentage will refuse to evacuate unless the needs of their animals are met. Arrangements to care for animals therefore need to be built into evacuation plans. This should include:

- animal transport and containers;
- establishing temporary shelters where animals can be looked after by vets and animal welfare charities;
- systems for people to put their pets into care in unaffected households or animal shelters in unaffected areas;
- systems to reunite people with their animals; and
- special arrangements with animal welfare charities (if they have the capabilities), zoos and/or wildlife centres for them to securely accommodate privately owned dangerous wild animals.

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40 Police should refer to the ACPO Manual.
For practical reasons farmed livestock will have to be left behind and farmers should be advised to take every practical measure to ensure their survival. However, emergency slaughter may sometimes be necessary (see paragraphs 6.14–6.15).

3.25 Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) Chief Inspectors are keen to liaise with emergency planning teams and local authorities on regional contingency plans. They can provide capabilities for transport and rescue of animals and livestock, fast-flooding and contamination incidents and animal media and community information strategies. As an example, Peterborough Council has a contingency stock of mobile, collapsible kennels for use in an emergency, stored with its local RSPCA. Other voluntary animal organisations may also be able to provide support.

3.26 Awareness campaigns on evacuation should explain what people should do about pets. In the first instance, the public should be encouraged to organise a safe place for their pets, other than a designated shelter, to stay in the event of an evacuation. Plans may include friends and families outside of the immediate area, hotels (if they accept pets), and animals shelters. However, evacuation plans should recognise that evacuees are likely to arrive at shelters with pets. As such, a separate pet area should be established for at least one shelter, under control of a designated local authority animal warden. Once owners have been registered, their pets should be registered and tagged. Plans should be put in place for communicating to owners that animals will not be allowed into the main shelter for health and safety reasons.

Business continuity

3.27 Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, local authorities have a duty to provide business continuity advice and assistance to those undertaking commercial activities and to voluntary organisations in the event of emergencies. In the context of evacuation planning, this means that local authorities should target businesses and voluntary organisations that are likely to contribute to the response to and recovery from an incident (eg private companies contracted to supply services). More generally, the generic business continuity advice local authorities give to commercial and voluntary organisations to fulfil their duty under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 should include information on evacuation issues. In particular, businesses should be encouraged to include measures within their plans to secure and protect their assets and valuables while premises are evacuated. Local authorities will of course also need to consider and advise on the business continuity implications of evacuation for organisations providing the services for which the local authority is directly or indirectly responsible – eg schools, social care providers, environmental services etc.

3.28 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 also places a duty on Category 1 responders to maintain plans to ensure that they can continue to exercise their functions in the event of an emergency so far as is reasonably practicable.

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41 See (paragraph 6.14) for advice on the relevant legal duties for animal welfare, including livestock.

42 Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 6.

43 Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 8.

44 Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 6.
Valuables

3.29 Proportionate measures should be taken by the person or organisation responsible for the valuable item/asset (eg items of personal, religious, cultural or national significance) to insure, protect and preserve them. Museums and places of worship, in particular, should make special provision to quickly and safely secure valuables if they are in danger of destruction, damage or theft. The removal of items/assets from evacuated buildings should not be undertaken if it places people in danger. The police are likely to have a role in allowing access to such buildings following evacuation.

Flooding

3.30 Planners should consider what additional arrangements are needed to support advice to ‘go in, stay in, tune in’ in flood-prone locations. The EA can advise on appropriate courses of action, in particular the correct messages to provide to the public in any given area as part of awareness raising for those in flood-risk areas. Many coastal areas have significant numbers of caravans and single-storey bungalows, whose residents may be particularly vulnerable to rising water. They would not be able to move to an upper storey. Unsecured caravans may float away and secured caravans may become flooded, trapping the inhabitants. Plans should identify alternative means of communicating to such residents and holiday makers, particularly when the power fails and only those few with wind-up/battery-powered radios will benefit from the ‘go in, stay in, tune in’ policy.

3.31 Some plans may use rest centres that are at risk from floods. Clearly, alternative shelter sites should be identified for flooding emergencies. Emergency services that have premises and depots at risk from floods should also have continuity plans in place to enable them to operate effectively during a flood.

3.32 In the event of a flood, people may need to be sheltered or moved to temporary accommodation for many months while homes are dried out and repaired. In coastal areas, salt damage may warrant the demolition and rebuilding of homes which means planning temporary accommodation for some families for 12–18 months.

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (‘CBRN’) and hazardous materials (‘HAZMATs’)

3.33 In the event of any incident involving the release or threatened release of harmful substances, decisions will have to be made on how best to prevent exposure and contamination. In the event of the deliberate release of CBRN substances, the police will decide whether or not the civilian population should be evacuated. The Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) will usually make the decision in consultation with other stakeholders in the event of an accidental release of HAZMATs. In reaching any decision to evacuate, the police or FRS will receive advice from other emergency services, government departments and agencies. This advice may be received through a ‘Joint Health Advisory Cell’ at the GOLD level, and/or through Health Advisory Teams (HATs) via Central Government crisis management arrangements. The advice will need to take into account the nature of the incident (in particular the characteristics of the harmful substance), meteorological conditions, population density and location. Details of these should be available to local or regional authorities through their own resources (eg local population statistics) and/or national assets (eg the Met Office, Health Protection Agency and the Defence, Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) Porton Down). All of these can apply modelling expertise to inform planning and the decision on whether to evacuate (for example, evacuation of people downwind from any plume).

45 Environment Agency maps for the public are at: www.environment-agency.gov.uk/.
46 This also occurred as a result of the Carlisle fluvial floods in 2005.
47 See the Central Government ‘Concept of Operations’ (CONOPS) at: www.ukresilience.info/publications/conops.pdf.
Any decision to evacuate should only be taken if there is time to achieve this before any hazard arrives and if the likely harm from exposure outweighs the hazards of evacuating large numbers of people. It is recognised that large-scale evacuation could be extremely difficult and time consuming. As is set out in paragraph 2.26, some members of the public may not heed official advice and may themselves decide to evacuate. In a CBRN or hazardous material incident, this may result in a risk of secondary contamination such that police may have to consider preventing people from leaving a cordon (see paragraph 6.2). As set out in paragraph 6.3, the police have a common law duty and power to take reasonable steps to save or preserve life. This could include preventing people from both entering and leaving a ‘hot zone’ (i.e., contaminated area). The FRS would lead in the decontamination of people (see paragraph 5.7).

Comprehensive advice concerning the decontamination of people is contained in the Home Office’s Strategic National Guidance on the Decontamination of People published in May 2004. Guidance on the decontamination of open spaces has been published by Defra, whilst the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) has published guidance on decontaminating buildings and infrastructure. The key decontamination issues for evacuation planners are:

- public awareness campaigns to inform the public that shelter in situ is likely to be the most sensible response in the event of a chemical or biological attack;
- effective measures to warn and inform the public, including communication equipment (e.g., loudhailers etc.) that can be used in a variety of scenarios (such as flooding and CBRN);
- people decontamination plans and capabilities given that the significant movement of people is inherent in any evacuation and may result in secondary contamination; and
- measures to limit the movement of animals (especially livestock) into or out of the contamination zone.

**Pandemic influenza**

The Department of Health (DH) has published comprehensive guidance on preparing for pandemic influenza. In Wales, the Office of the Chief Medical Officer has published similar advice. Current contingency planning does not envisage the evacuation of people in the event of an actual or potential pandemic flu outbreak. For the latest on pandemic flu, planners should in the first instance consult the DH or WAG websites. The UK Resilience website also maintains a pandemic flu section which collates guidance and information for practitioners.

**Return**

Early consideration should be given to planning for re-occupation of premises and affected areas. This is a complex issue with serious safety consequences for the public and will require close liaison through the multi-agency Gold Command to ensure a controlled return by residents to their premises once it is safe to do so. Transport may need to be provided, as well as follow-up visits by appropriate services (e.g., social services and Police Community Support Officers). In planning for re-occupation it is important to consider people’s likely reactions to damage to their properties and to provide appropriate emotional and practical support. Crime prevention advice will be particularly important if premises are likely to remain unoccupied whilst damage is repaired (see paragraphs 3.21–3.23 and 6.12).

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Recovery

3.38 Full recovery from a serious event can take years and will involve significant resources. The inter-linked consequences that follow an evacuation include economic, environmental, social and health dimensions. The consideration of actions that could be taken before, during and after an emergency situation to promote recovery should be central to emergency planning. This may include the identification of specialist resources to aid recovery (such as engineers to restore services), or simply defining a process to enable a full needs analysis to be undertaken after an event, within appropriate timescales.

3.39 Roles and responsibilities of all organisations involved in the recovery phase should be clearly defined at a local level. In most cases the multi-agency recovery effort is likely to be led by the local authority, drawing together all relevant agencies including the voluntary sector. Agency roles and responsibilities in the change-over to the recovery phase should be agreed and clearly defined. Recovery also requires effective consultation, stakeholder and contract management and communication with the public. This is particularly important where individuals face prolonged absence from their homes and businesses.

International

3.40 Local authorities and other responders may need to provide support to British nationals and their family members who are evacuated to the UK from an overseas emergency or disaster. Previous experience of such evacuations suggests that the majority of evacuees are unlikely to require assistance, other than on immediate arrival in the UK. There are likely to be some, though, that will require welfare or social assistance in the longer term. UK citizens who are not habitually resident in the UK (or wider Common Travel Area) are not eligible for income-related benefits and social housing. However, in exceptional circumstances, Parliament may be asked to temporarily waive this requirement for evacuees. Further guidance on evacuations from overseas will be published on the UK Resilience website in 2007.
Chapter 4
Communications and the media

Summary

- All local responders have a duty under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to make arrangements to warn, inform and alert the public and media in an emergency. This duty applies to evacuation (paragraphs 4.1–4.4).

- A flexible and resilient communications ‘tool kit’, not reliant on one system alone (eg telephonic means), should be built up (paragraph 4.5).

- Examples of best practice on communications (paragraphs 4.4–4.5).

- Examples of initial ‘top line’ communications and media messages (Annex 4A).

- Key points: communications on evacuation should be:
  - persuasive;
  - aim to reduce anxiety;
  - take into account the different risks faced by an area;
  - take into account different vulnerable and language groups;
  - maintain contact with evacuees whilst they are away from home; and
  - be exercised (paragraphs 4.6–4.11).

- Involving business in evacuation and shelter communications plans (paragraph 4.12).

- Using the media in an evacuation scenario (paragraphs 4.13–4.15).

- Resilience and security issues for evacuation communications (paragraphs 4.16–4.17).
Communication

4.1 All local responders have duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to:
• raise public awareness prior to an event;
• warn the public at the time of an event or when one is likely; and
• inform and advise the public in the immediate and long term post-event.

4.2 The duties apply both to planning for and carrying out evacuation and shelter. Evacuation scenarios present particular communication challenges for planners, and communication breakdown is likely to be the single biggest cause of failure during a short-notice evacuation. Detailed suggestions on how the communication requirements of the Act may be carried out, the generic forms of communication that may be used and a list of Category 1 responders from whom to identify a lead responder to maintain arrangements can be found in the Emergency Preparedness guidance.

4.3 Plans should be maintained to:
• educate the public about evacuation and shelter, preparing them for the types of message they may receive and helping them prepare. This education and awareness-raising should build on information already in the public domain such as that on the Preparing for Emergencies website; and
• warn those directly affected to take action to reduce their risk of personal harm.

4.4 LRFs will also need to maintain arrangements to alert the public to the need to evacuate. There are a number of good examples of local authorities implementing alerting systems such as those using text messages, telephone call-back, email and the internet to alert businesses and the public to incidents. Public education is important, and many authorities also offer specific guidance on the types of alerting mechanism to be used in an evacuation in leaflets or web-based publications. To assist local responders, the Cabinet Office is working with the National Steering Committee on Warning and Informing the Public (NSCWIP) to identify areas of best practice on communicating with the public in an emergency. This will be published on the UK Resilience website towards the end of 2006.

4.5 For both warning and informing, no one system will be sufficient for all evacuation scenarios. Planners are advised to develop a flexible tool kit of communications capabilities. Evacuation may take place at different times of the day or night and from locations as varied as homes, industrial complexes, shopping malls, ports or airports. Systems such as those using text messages, telephone call-back and the internet should be complemented by other means. For example, use of the media, public address announcements (e.g., systems such as Sky Shout), face-to-face contact, existing tannoy systems (such as those in shopping malls, commercial properties and stations) and display screens. Both CCTV and urban traffic management and control systems can play a valuable role, especially in city centres, in managing evacuation events (i.e., warning and informing and providing real-time information on traffic and people flows).

51 See Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 7.
52 As an example of good practice, many local authorities in conjunction with local police authorities have adopted the priority ‘Alert’ scheme. This telephonic system is used by the police to send priority alert messages on emergencies to all those people and businesses registered. Messages on the scheme can be sent via SMS text messaging to mobile phones, email or pagers. For example, see: www.manchester.gov.uk/emergency/cccevac.htm#Priority.
53 See, for example, Leeds City Council’s ‘What Should I Do in an Emergency’: www.leeds.gov.uk.
Key points for evacuation communications

4.6 Persuasive communication strategies need to be prepared. They need to be flexible to meet the particular requirements of the incident. They should also be targeted at the different audiences for an evacuation (e.g., the public, media, businesses, and responders). In many situations (see paragraph 6.2) it is neither possible nor desirable to force people to take a particular course of action. Instead, the public need to be persuaded that it is in their best interests. In an evacuation scenario, this may include adequately explaining the arrangements to look after their family, pets, and property. It also may involve explaining that the emergency services will not be able to assist them or guarantee their safety should they ignore advice to evacuate. In many scenarios, including real or perceived terrorist threats, the communication strategy will need to explain why people should not evacuate and rather shelter in situ (i.e., ‘go in, stay in, tune in’). It may also need to explain why people should not enter/re-enter an evacuation zone and advice on avoiding hazards, such as the downwind plume in a CBRN incident. Examples of initial, ‘top line’ communication and media messages are at Annex 4A.

4.7 Communication strategies should aim to reduce worry as far as possible. Being evacuated can be a highly traumatic experience, particularly if it is undertaken at little or no notice, but appropriate communication strategies can make a significant difference. The extent to which individuals affected develop trauma-related disorders may be affected by how they perceive the incident and by the reactions of others.

4.8 Experience from many emergencies suggests that people cope better when they have good access to information. Therefore evacuation planning should address both the means of communicating general information to everyone who has been displaced (including those in rest centres) and arrangements for responding to specific queries or concerns (e.g., the whereabouts of a family member). Particular consideration should be given to providing information to groups or individuals with specific needs (including vulnerable people) who may not be able to access regular media channels (such as the television or internet) or understand the standard evacuation messages.

4.9 Communication plans should take into account the different language groups of those affected by the evacuation. Local authorities should pre-identify the key foreign languages spoken in their areas and develop pre-planned communications material in these languages as well as English. Established lines of communication between local authorities/police with local community leaders of different language groups can be utilised to help ensure the message gets through.

4.10 Maintaining good communication with evacuees throughout the time that they are displaced is important. This will help avoid unnecessary worry and may also discourage people from attempting to return to their homes before it is safe to do so.

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54 For further information see ‘Protecting Against Terrorism’: www.mi5.gov.uk and www.pfe.gov.uk.
55 See the section of this guidance on groups with specific needs, paragraphs 3.13–3.20.
56 See, for example, Manchester’s video ‘Information for Evacuees’ in English and British Sign Language alternating with Arabic, Urdu, Bangladeshi and Cantonese, which has been developed to be played in the reception area of a rest centre: www.manchester.gov.uk/emergency/publications.htm.
4.11 Communication strategies should take into account the different risks faced by an area and should be tested by exercising. For example, in a flood-prone area, planners may wish to make sure that an adequate supply of loudhailers and appropriate signage is ready and that information is pre-circulated to the public on what to do in a flood (such as contacting the EA Floodline and keeping a battery-operated/ wind-up radio available). Plans for specific sites should include communications to cover all parts of the building, and methods of communicating with evacuees at muster points and shelters should also be tested.

Box 4.1: Principles of good communication

Inform – use public awareness campaigns to make people aware of the process for evacuation and their own responsibilities.

Keep it simple – the information should be clear, brief and memorable.

Explain – why they are being evacuated and why it is in the individual’s interest to follow the instructions.

Be specific – the individual needs to be told what to do and what to take, where they are going, how they will be transported, roughly when, what they should do to protect their property and what to do about pets.

Reassure – tell them what will happen next, and avoid inducing fear.

Direct contact – from a trusted source will be more persuasive.

Repeat – key messages frequently.

Use a wide range of message vehicles – for example self-help leaflets, door-to-door calls, media broadcasts, tannoy announcements, loudhailers, alerting systems, the internet etc.

Use existing communication mechanisms (eg community and faith groups) to relay messages.

Take language barriers into account.

Vulnerable people should receive the earliest possible warnings and instructions.

Business

4.12 An evacuation is likely to have a major impact on local businesses, both in terms of their business premises being evacuated or the premises being used as a place to shelter. As part of the duty on local authorities to give advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations on business continuity management, local authorities should develop processes to engage with businesses to help them plan for risks that may give rise to evacuation and shelter. This should include arrangements for businesses to be kept informed during an evacuation incident. Businesses should also be prompted to develop their own logistic/communication plans for evacuation in conjunction with local authority plans. Chapter 8 of Emergency Preparedness provides a variety of approaches to engage with local businesses. Communications strategies for businesses should make clear that return and recovery may take anything between from weeks to months and possibly years if premises are contaminated, seriously damaged or destroyed.

Media

4.13 National and local media are the main conduit through which the public can be warned and informed through joint agency media plans. Again, details are available in Emergency Preparedness and via the BBC ‘Connecting in a Crisis’ initiative. This gives advice on producing strategy and public awareness


58 As an example of good practice, see Leeds City Council’s guidance for local businesses to develop effective evacuation plans: www.leeds.gov.uk under ‘Evacuation’.

59 Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 7.
broadcasts through the Government News Network to present cohesive messages. Emergency planners should consider how best to utilise the national and local media in an evacuation. This should include:

- Using them to help deliver messages on key health issues on how the public can help themselves and others;
- Keeping the public, especially friends and families, informed on the response; and
- Reassuring the public, especially friends and families.

4.14 Particular attention should be given to the prior establishment of a media liaison point (for business continuity reasons, more than one point should be established) and identifying experienced Media Liaison Officers (likely to be from the police), one of whom should attend at any scene. If rest centres attract media attention, a Media Liaison Officer may be required. Media representatives should not be allowed to enter a shelter unaccompanied.

4.15 Planners should not rely solely on local and national media to communicate to the public. This is because the disruptive event that necessitated the evacuation in the first place may mean television, telephone and internet capabilities are severely impaired (e.g. by flood damage to electricity). In addition, media outlets may not focus on the same areas or issues which are the main thrust of local responders’ communications strategy. (Though in general the media do all they can to help, they are under no obligation to do so, and it is possible some may focus on aspects of the emergency response that are perceived to have failed.)

Resilient communications

4.16 It is vital that local and regional responders and other organisations understand which of their telecommunications systems are critical to their business, and how to provide the appropriate level of resilience for these systems. Organisations should not rely solely on one technical solution. Telecommunications resilience is particularly important for some of the scenarios that may give rise to large-scale evacuation and sheltering such as flooding (which could disrupt electricity and hence the availability of core telephony services) and major terrorist incidents (which could lead to significant public fear and alarm and cause the mobile telephone system to be overloaded). The Cabinet Office will publish guidance on resilient communications on the UK Resilience website later in 2006.

Security

4.17 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 prohibits Category 1 and 2 responders from publishing or otherwise disclosing any sensitive information which it has received by virtue of the Act or created in the course of discharging its duties under the Act. Emergency planners developing local and regional evacuation plans should have particular regard to these regulations. For example, some major evacuation plans may identify collection/marshalling points for evacuation following a major terrorist attack. Clearly this information may be sensitive given it could be of use to terrorists planning to attack large congregations of people. If emergency planners or local responders have any doubt about the security and/or sensitivity of their plans, they should consult with the police and with their legal advisers as regards freedom of information requests/subject access requests under the Data Protection Act 1998. Emergency planners should also be aware that some evacuation planning, especially relating to site-specific locations, may be commercially sensitive.
Summary

- This chapter provides further advice on co-ordinating a multi-agency response for evacuation and shelter. It sets out the evacuation and shelter responsibilities of the following key organisations:
  - **Police (paragraphs 5.3–5.6) possible evacuation lead**, recommending evacuation, informing the local authority, setting up a casualty bureau, assisting with the crime prevention strategy.
  - **Fire and Rescue Service (paragraph 5.7) possible evacuation lead**, verifying safety of shelter plans, decontaminating people, urban search and rescue, providing pumps and rescue for floods, making areas safe for return.
  - **Ambulance Service (paragraphs 5.8–5.9)** dealing with casualties and providing medical assistance/transportation for the vulnerable with NHS and local authorities, including at rest centres.
  - **Maritime and Coastguard Agency (paragraph 5.10)** providing support/resources for river and coastal evacuations, search and rescue at sea/some inland waters and evacuating seafarers and passengers from vessels/oil and gas facilities.
  - **Local authorities (paragraphs 5.11–5.18) possible evacuation lead**, drawing up and exercising evacuation plans, providing rest centres, transport to rest centres and welfare support (including food and medical), leading on rehabilitation and long-term welfare support for survivors. Also responsible for the safety and preparedness of schools, children’s homes, public highways that are not motorways or major trunk roads and the recovery phase.
  - **Voluntary and community sector (paragraphs 5.19–5.21)** the LRF representative establishes ongoing links with a wide range of organisations through the Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum.
  - **Health (paragraphs 5.22–5.24)** providing primary care for the evacuated population. Working with local authorities to identify and support the vulnerable. NHS Trusts plan for the evacuation of hospitals and Strategic Health Authorities plan for provision of healthcare to refugees.
  - **Environment Agency (paragraphs 5.25–5.26)** preventing and minimising environmental impacts, investigating causes of incidents, issuing flood warnings, mobilising flood defence assets and providing waste disposal capabilities.
  - **Highways Agency/Transport Wales (paragraphs 5.27–5.28)** closing roads on police request, dealing with abandoned/damaged cars and providing roadblocks.
Introduction

5.1 Successful evacuation and shelter requires a well co-ordinated multi-agency response. A large number of organisations must work effectively together to ensure that people advised to leave their homes or other locations remain supported and protected until they can safely return. The local response is the building block of the UK’s emergency response arrangements. In the case of evacuation and shelter it is particularly important that the response is managed locally, by those familiar with local circumstances. Emergency Response and Recovery provides an overview of the UK’s structured response to emergencies and the main structures relating to evacuation are summarised at Annex 5A of this guidance. An example of a generic evacuation plan and a flow diagram summarising the key stages in an evacuation are at Annexes 5B and 5C.

5.2 The rest of this chapter describes the evacuation and shelter responsibilities of key organisations. While local communities do not have a formal role or responsibility for evacuation or shelter, they perform an important role in responding to, and recovering from, an emergency. It is important, therefore, that local authorities engage and communicate with their public and communities about what they should, and can, do in an evacuation to help themselves and others.

Police

5.3 In an evacuation situation, the focus of the police will be on saving and protecting life. It is normally the police who recommend whether or not to evacuate and define the area to be evacuated in consultation with key stakeholders (though for small-scale incidents, the decision to evacuate may be taken by the person in charge of any building/facility involved). Police should contact the local authority as early as possible, so that local authorities can implement plans for their areas of responsibility. These include arrangements for transport of people and rest centres. Failure to contact the local authority early on can slow the evacuation and may later result in confusion over financial responsibilities.

5.4 Immediate decisions to evacuate will be taken on the ground by the responding police officer. Where a large-scale evacuation is involved and there is sufficient time, this judgement would be led by the multi-agency Gold Commander. This will include the assessment mentioned in paragraph 1.6 of whether the physical and organisational challenges posed by an evacuation can be managed safely, and whether bringing people outdoors rather than sheltering them indoors exposes them to greater risk. The local authority’s ability to provide shelter safely to evacuees will also be key. It is important that, as far as possible, the judgement is a multi-agency decision given the response (and its financial implications) will need to involve a number of responders and agencies.

5.5 Where appropriate, the police should set up a casualty bureau in the event that large numbers of enquiries are expected. The casualty bureau should be made aware of the areas evacuated and location of, and contact details for, rest centres.

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64 The multi-agency Gold Command is also known as the ‘Strategic Co-ordinating Group’.

65 For further information, see Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 7, Box 7.6. Guidance for the police is available in the ACPO Manual.
5.6 In a large evacuation there may be extensive calls for police assistance both within the evacuation zone and in the receiving areas, but clearly police resources are finite. Evacuation planning should aim to alleviate these competing pressures in advance. It should also ensure that no other organisation is left exposed because it has made unrealistic assumptions about the level of police assistance it will receive in a major evacuation. If the evacuation is extended the police and local authority may need to consider alternative security arrangements (such as the use of private-sector security personnel). The same point relates to the provision of military assistance (which is covered in greater detail in Annex 5A).

**Fire and Rescue Service**

5.7 The FRS in England and Wales has a pivotal role to play in risk assessment and response to a wide range of emergencies. The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 extended the traditional sphere of the FRS’ functions to give it the power to respond to non-fire emergencies. Their expertise and equipment for dealing with a wide range of emergencies gives them a key role in multi-agency planning. In most cases, the boundaries of the local fire and rescue authority will be coterminous with, or very similar to, the LRF area. FRS can provide the following capabilities:

- verifying shelter plans to make sure that they are ‘fire safe’;
- using decontamination units during an evacuation;
- search and rescue capabilities for people and animals in the urban and water environments;
- using boats and high-pressure pumps during a flood; and
- making an area safe for returning people (with the final decision being made by the multi-agency Gold Commander).

**Box 5.1: New Dimension Programme**

The New Dimension programme is one part of the DCLG’s contribution to the government’s civil contingencies Capabilities Programme. Its aim is to enhance England and Wales’ preparedness and resilience by improving the capability of the FRS to respond to major and catastrophic incidents – many of which could entail evacuation. The programme is delivering six distinct capabilities: mass decontamination, urban search and rescue, water capabilities, command and control, operational logistics and support and long-term capability management.

If a CBRN attack were to occur, it is likely that the FRS would be among the first people to arrive at the site. The Service also has the ability to mobilise large numbers of firefighters and equipment rapidly. For this reason they have, in partnership with the DH/WAG, accepted responsibility for the management of public mass decontamination in the event of CBRN attack. The New Dimension programme has already delivered new equipment and procedures to enable decontamination of large numbers of the public at the site of a CBRN incident.

In the event of localised flooding, large-scale flooding of underground facilities or large-scale fire, the transportation of large quantities of water may be required. Supplementary equipment, procedures and training to provide a risk-based tiered response, including rescue from still and flowing water, may be provided by the FRS in partnership with other emergency responders.

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66 Fire and rescue is a devolved function in Wales.

67 In Wales, there are four LRFs and only three FRS.
### Ambulance Service

**5.8** Ambulance Services provide an accident and emergency service (to respond to 999 calls) and patient transport services for routine out-patients. In the event of an emergency, ambulance trusts will implement their agreed major incident plan. They will have a key role in responding to the needs of human casualties and provide an interface with the NHS. Ambulance services should be ready to implement mutual aid agreements and call on voluntary sector capability to augment capacity. Resources will be focussed on triaging, treating and transporting casualties in the immediate aftermath of any major incident. Emergency planners should therefore not rely on the Ambulance Service to provide transport for vulnerable people in the community or non-critical patients to be evacuated from hospitals, where alternative non-specialised means of transport would suffice. For these groups of people, the NHS and local authorities (especially social services) will need to work in partnership to allow their transfer to a place of safety. This is because whilst transport (eg provision of coaches) may be accessed through emergency planning units of local authorities, the NHS will need to provide any medical supervision required during the evacuation process (for example, a paramedic and appropriate equipment for the coaches).

**5.9** The ambulance service and associated voluntary organisations (such as the British Red Cross and St. John’s Ambulance) will also have a role to play at rest centres, where they may collect and help administer medication from local hospitals and assist individuals who require treatment, counselling or regular transport to hospital.

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### Maritime and Coastguard Agency

**5.10** The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is responsible throughout the UK for implementing the government’s maritime safety policy. This includes co-ordinating search and rescue at sea and on certain inland waters through HM Coastguard, and checking that ships meet UK and international safety rules. The MCA works to prevent the loss of lives at the coast and at sea, to ensure that ships are safe, and to prevent coastal pollution. The evacuation incidents that the MCA is involved in are varied in both type and complexity and include the emergency evacuation of seafarers and passengers from ships (including passenger ships of all kinds), fishing vessels and recreational craft, and from offshore oil/gas installations. In the event of a river or coastal evacuation, the MCA can provide support and resources.

### Local authorities

**5.11** Local authorities are responsible for co-ordinating welfare support to their communities in the event of an emergency and play an important leadership role, which includes:

- providing temporary shelter (rest centres) including any transport arrangements needed to help people get to and from these;
- providing information from the electoral roll to police casualty bureaux to assist in accounting for evacuees;
- ensuring suitable arrangements are in place to meet welfare needs;
- feeding and providing refreshment for those in temporary shelter;
- establishing arrangements for local GPs to issue emergency prescriptions at rest centres.

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68 The Ambulance Service in Wales is a devolved function.

69 See also paragraphs 2.2, 3.5 and 6.23.

70 See Chapter 3 of this guidance.
• meeting needs for temporary accommodation where evacuation is extended;
• the production and exercising of evacuation and shelter plans, including mutual aid arrangements with other authorities for cross-border and very large-scale incidents;
• leadership during the recovery phase of an evacuation;
• leading the rehabilitation of the community and restoring the environment, with assistance from the Government Decontamination Service if necessary; and
• co-ordinating work to meet the long-term social and welfare needs of survivors, their families and friends.

5.12 As with other key Category 1 responders, local authorities’ resources are finite. Discharging these responsibilities may require local authority staff to be diverted from their normal roles to help with the emergency response. For example, plans could assign Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) and community wardens to assist the police with evacuation in some areas. Local authority emergency planners will need to draw on contacts and resources across the responding agencies, voluntary sector and private/commercial organisations in making their plans. Local authorities need to agree (where possible in advance) funding arrangements for services provided by commercial and voluntary sectors.

5.13 Local authorities are also responsible directly or indirectly for the preparedness and safety of many other local institutions and bodies, some of which are described below.

Schools

5.14 Education employers, like all employers, have a statutory duty of care towards their employees and those affected by their undertakings. School staff must co-operate with their employer (local authority, governing body or proprietor) in taking reasonably practicable steps to ensure the health and safety of pupils (as people affected by the employer’s undertaking). Teachers also have a common law duty to act in place of the parent. This law would continue to apply during evacuation or shelter whilst school staff have lawful charge or control of the pupils.71 Where pupils are evacuated to a shelter, the length of time that it is reasonable for children to remain in the care of their school will depend on all the circumstances of the case, including the age of the child. However, head teachers of all types of school, subject to advice and instructions from their local authority’s emergency planning officers, should:

• be made aware that a school evacuation plan could, in the event of fire or other disturbance, also be implemented as part of an area-wide evacuation and what this might entail;
• maintain arrangements for contacting parents in the event of the school being evacuated (eg through direct contact and/or broadcasts);
• establish arrangements for safeguarding children if the parents are not able to collect them at the end of the school day because of an evacuation activity or any other emergency with major impacts. Such arrangements could include the use of temporary shelter provided by the local authority and the use of home–school buses/the school minibus as appropriate;

71 The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HSWA) applies to employers when there are emergencies. The extent to which it will apply will depend on the facts of each case. Procedures need to be in place to deal with evacuations, further to both HSWA and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, as employees cease to be ‘at work’ only when they are no longer in the employer’s control. See paragraphs 6.17–6.20 of this guidance for further information on health and safety legislation.
plan on the basis that teachers should stay with evacuated children until the last child is reunited with their parents/guardians or alternative arrangements are made with an appropriate responsible person or persons (such as a representative from Children's Services); and

- do what they can to help school staff looking after pupils during or after evacuation who will wish to join their own families.

Children’s homes

5.15 Local authorities have a statutory duty under health and safety legislation and the 2004 Children Act (as well as a common law duty) to maintain and safeguard the welfare of children in their care, and provide them with accommodation. Though most children’s homes accommodate only a few children, some secure children’s homes hold larger numbers of particularly vulnerable children. Procedures for evacuation in the event of a fire should already be in place, but children’s homes need to also work with local emergency planners to ensure appropriate arrangements for evacuation are put in place at all children’s homes in line with guidance to be issued by the Youth Justice Board.72

Highway authorities

5.16 A highway authority refers to a local authority’s responsibility for all public highways in its area that are not motorways or major trunk roads (these are covered by the Highways Agency, see paragraph 5.27). Highway authorities in England or Wales have a responsibility to keep public highways open and remove obstructions and encroachments which may affect their use and safety. In an evacuation, highway authorities may also have a significant communications role (see paragraph 4.5).

5.17 The powers to establish Passenger Transport Authorities (PTAs) and Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs) are contained in the 1968 Transport Act and the Local Government Acts of 1972 and 1985.73 A PTA is made up of elected representatives from the area served by the authority. A PTE carries out the policies of the PTA. They are funded by a combination of local council tax and grants from national government. Given PTEs’ wide-ranging roles and responsibilities in public transportation (including owning and operating most local bus stations, stops and shelters, providing information about bus services, running operational light rail and metro schemes outside of London and having some responsibilities relating to schools transport) local authorities should liaise closely with them in developing evacuation plans.

5.18 Beyond the goods and services that the private sector delivers for the planning and executing of an evacuation, they can play an important role in assisting the evacuation process. This may be through knowledge of buildings/premises (e.g. underground train operators), their capabilities (e.g. coaches at airports) and their communications systems (e.g. shopping centre tannoy systems) or their ability to organise evacuation for their own staff. It is important, therefore, that local authorities engage closely with major businesses before and during an evacuation.

Voluntary and community sector

5.19 The voluntary and community sectors can perform a wide variety of important operational and support roles ranging from assistance for animals, assistance with rest centres, provision of food and refreshment, practical and emotional support, equipment, training and exercising.74 Community groups and leaders can promote self-help within affected communities and

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72 For guidance, see: www.youth-justice-board.gov.uk/YouthJusticeBoard/.
73 In Wales, there are no PTAs or PTEs.
74 See Emergency Preparedness, Annex 14A which sets out examples of the wide-ranging support activities volunteers can provide.
for vulnerable community members. Early engagement of voluntary and community groups in evacuation planning will enable LRFs to make the most of the capabilities offered by these local groups. As Emergency Response and Recovery sets out, LRFs are obliged to ‘have regard’ to the voluntary sector in their planning under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. They should have a voluntary and community sector group through which they can effectively engage with this large and diverse sector.

5.20 The Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum is a cohesive platform for those voluntary organisations which have a role to play in the UK’s emergency planning and response. The Forum is chaired by the British Red Cross and provides an effective link across these voluntary organisations. It can assist in co-ordinating the contribution of the voluntary sector in UK and national emergencies and, if appropriate, support initiatives at a local level. Through this cohesive approach, the voluntary sector representative contributing to an LRF’s voluntary sector group should be able to speak on behalf of other voluntary organisations operating in the area. Voluntary organisations that can provide assistance with evacuation include, but are not restricted to, the British Red Cross, St John’s Ambulance, the Samaritans, the WRVS, Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) and the RSPCA.

Box 5.2: Voluntary groups supporting evacuation

Following the evacuation of 60,000 people from the Aintree racecourse as a result of a bomb alert in 1997, food and refreshment was provided to around 40,000 people stranded through a combination of local authority provision, donations (for example, local supermarkets), voluntary sector contributions and emergency acquisition arrangements activated by the Salvation Army. Radio Merseyside, the local BBC news and phone-in station, became a clearing house for offers of private accommodation. Local church halls were also activated within the community.

5.21 Generally, local authorities will provide the lead in co-ordinating voluntary and community sector assistance with the humanitarian response. They will also need to consider in advance how to deploy spontaneous offers of support from individuals and businesses.

Health

5.22 NHS Trusts should already have procedures for evacuating areas of a facility in the event of major disruptions. These should be aligned with the hospital’s major incident plans. The total evacuation of a hospital or mental health facility would, however, be considered only under extreme circumstances. In such circumstances the decision to evacuate would be made locally taking into account:

- the overall risk to patients;
- appropriate, safe transport and patient-tracking mechanisms; and
- a pre-planned and suitably equipped destination.

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75 See paragraphs 3.13–3.20 of this guidance on groups with specific needs.
5.23 Whilst separate specific guidance will be issued on evacuation planning by the DH, the key elements which need to be considered by the NHS are:

- Maintaining primary care services to the population being evacuated, including special measures to offer support during the period of evacuation.
- Through close working with social services and voluntary organisations, identifying and supporting vulnerable people who are being evacuated.
- All hospitals trusts and in-patient care facilities should have plans in place to effect an evacuation if required. However, such plans should ensure that any evacuation of a hospital is seen as a last resort.
- All Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) must have a plan to provide healthcare services for a significant population influx that may have been evacuated from a wider geographical area. This should include providing healthcare to those made ill, or more seriously so, by the process of evacuation. In Wales, this responsibility falls to the Local Health Boards, working closely with health and local authority partners.
- All NHS Trusts are expected to have business continuity arrangements in place to reduce the risk of evacuation in predictable circumstances.

5.24 The Health Protection Agency (HPA) is an independent organisation dedicated to protecting people’s health in the United Kingdom. It provides support and advice on health protection issues to the NHS, local authorities, emergency services, other Arms Length Bodies, the DH and the Devolved Administrations in the UK. It has a network of approximately 3000 staff based locally, regionally and at three major centres throughout England. The Agency can provide expert advice on a wide range of public health issues relating to emergencies (especially in relation to communicable diseases, radiation and chemical hazards).

Environment Agency

5.25 The EA is the leading public body for protecting and improving the environment in England and Wales. As an environmental regulator, with a wide range of roles and responsibilities, it responds to many different types of incident affecting the natural environment, human health or property. The EA’s main priorities at incidents are to:

- prevent or minimise the impact of the incident;
- investigate the cause of the incident and consider enforcement action; and
- seek remediation, clean-up or restoration of the environment.

5.26 The role of the EA at an incident depends on the nature of the event:

- In a flood event, it focuses on operational issues (such as issuing flood warnings and operating its flood defence assets to protect communities at risk). Flood warnings can be issued by the EA to the public directly via the Flood Warning Direct (FWD) service or indirectly via sirens, loudhailers and media broadcasts. Where possible they predict the likelihood of flood defences being overtopped. This information is critical in the decision-making to evacuate before a flood.
- In a pollution incident, it will seek to prevent, control and monitor the input of pollutants to the environment.

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77 For further information on DH emergency planning see: www.dh.gov.uk/PolicyAndGuidance/EmergencyPlanning/fs/en. The Welsh Assembly Government will be issuing guidance for Wales that will be in line with that issued in England.

78 For further information on the Health Protection Agency see: www.hpa.org.uk/default.htm.
• In other emergencies (such as animal disease outbreaks), its usual role is to regulate and provide advice and support on waste disposal issues.  

Highways Agency/Transport Wales

5.27 The Highways Agency (HA) is an Executive Agency of the Department for Transport (DfT), and is responsible for operating, maintaining and improving the strategic road network (ie all motorways and major trunk roads) in England on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport. In Wales, the responsibility for the trunk road and motorway network lies with Transport Wales on behalf of the WAG. These key arterial routes may be the main conduit for evacuating a large area, and may in some circumstances (such as severe weather) require evacuation. The HA/WAG is able to close arterial routes to the public to allow the emergency services access and enable evacuation if requested by the police. On the strategic road network, the HA is responsible for dealing with abandoned cars, removing damaged or broken down cars, and providing rolling roadblocks and temporary road closures (in Wales this is still a matter for the police, though Transport Wales can assist if requested). These powers result from the Highways Act 1980.

5.28 In conjunction with other key Government departments and local responders, the HA is currently working towards establishing national policy guidance for the provision of welfare in the event motorists should become stranded for extended periods on its motorways or trunk roads.

Transport companies

5.29 Given the role of commercial transport capabilities and services in evacuation, local and regional responders should engage and consult with key companies in developing their evacuation plans. These companies could include the major air and train operating companies, as well as those that own or maintain the infrastructure (such as British Airports Authority or Network Rail).

Prison Service and Immigration Service

5.30 In the vast majority of cases where evacuation is required, prisoners would be moved to safe areas within the secure perimeter of the prison or if necessary to other prisons under secure escort. If there was an immediate threat to life and there was insufficient time to evacuate prisoners securely to other prisons however, emergency powers under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 do enable Ministers to make arrangements for the temporary release of prisoners. As set out in Prison Service guidance, it is mandatory for prison governors to have plans in place for total evacuation. The guidance

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79 For further information on the EA see: www.environment-agency.gov.uk.
80 For further information on the HA see: www.highways.gov.uk.
(Transport for London are now responsible for all the trunk roads within the London area.)
81 This guidance is due to be published in early 2007 and will be placed on the UK Resilience website: www.ukresilience.info.
82 For further information on Network Rail see: www.networkrail.co.uk. For further information on train operating companies, see the website of the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) which represents train companies to the government and regulatory bodies: www.atoc.org/index.asp.
83 As sections 6.4–6.6 describe in more detail, emergency powers are unlikely to be enacted and it is not possible to predict the regulations that they may contain. See the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, section 19.
also advises that prison governors considering evacuation should seek to consult with local and regional emergency planners (for example with the Regional Resilience Team or WAG).

5.31 Immigration Detention and Removal Centres follow a similar approach with a mutual aid protocol in place between the Prison Service and the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) which allows the Prison Office crisis management structures to support senior IND staff in the management of an incident at one of the detention and removal centres. Each centre is required, under IND guidance, to have full contingency plans for total evacuation. In the event of an incident that required significant evacuation of detention centres, detainees are likely either to be moved to other secure accommodation (as was the case at the Oakington Reception Centre in October 2005 when two 1,000 pound World War Two bombs were found) or to be bailed (though in the case of a riot, detainees would not be bailed).

Employers

5.32 Under health and safety legislation, all employers must address potential risks to the health and safety of their employees, contractors and visitors and those affected by their undertakings, and this may include any threats from terrorism. Regulations under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 have a variety of evacuation planning implications for employers. Employers will want to ensure these health and safety requirements are considered carefully when preparing their evacuation plans. Employers should, in line with risk assessments, develop and test evacuation plans and liaise with local authority emergency planning officials to make sure that they are appropriate.

Further information can be found at: www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/hsc13.pdf.
Chapter 6
Legal and financial issues

Summary

• This chapter sets out a number of the key statutory duties relevant to evacuation of people and animals, from the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and other legislation. Planners should understand these to inform the development and implementation of their evacuation and shelter plans (paragraph 6.1). It also considers financial issues.

• This chapter covers:
  – Enforcing evacuation (paragraphs 6.2–6.3);
  – Use of emergency powers (paragraphs 6.4–6.6);
  – Providing temporary shelter (rest centres) (paragraph 6.7);
  – Homelessness legislation (paragraphs 6.8–6.11);
  – Crime prevention responsibilities (paragraph 6.12);
  – The Children and Education Acts (paragraph 6.13);
  – Animal-related responsibilities (paragraphs 6.14–6.16);
  – Employment legislation (paragraphs 6.17–6.20);
  – Site-specific evacuations (paragraphs 6.21–6.22);
  – Collecting and sharing personal data (paragraph 6.23);
  – Maritime safety regulations (paragraphs 6.24–6.25);
  – Finance (paragraphs 6.26–6.28); and
  – Insurance (paragraph 6.29).
Introduction

6.1 Planners need to make sure that an understanding of the legal context of evacuation and shelter informs the development and implementation of their plans. It is important that they do not assume the existence of emergency powers legislation means that it can easily be used. Equally, they should properly understand the implications of other laws rather than just accepting common interpretations of them (eg in relation to Working Time Regulations and data protection issues). Where there is a clear duty or power their plans must take appropriate account of it.

Enforcing evacuation

6.2 Generally speaking the police do not have specific statutory powers to enforce a request or order to leave an area. The main exception to this is in relation to acts of terrorism where there are statutory powers to cordon off areas and it is an offence to fail to comply with an order to leave a cordoned area immediately. Evacuation may also be enforced under the Public Health Act 1984 if it is necessitated by infection or disease. In many cases though, mandatory evacuation will, in practice, be almost impossible to enforce, as experience in the US has shown. Developing the right communications strategies is a much more effective solution for evacuation.

6.3 The police have a common law duty and power to take reasonable steps to save or preserve life. They also have a common law duty to keep the peace and maintain order. This duty will often be more relevant to police control of crowds and traffic on the move following an evacuation request rather than to ordering people to leave. Police and Highways Authorities/WAG have some powers to close and open roads.

Use of emergency powers

6.4 There should be no expectation that Government will use emergency powers under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to facilitate an evacuation. The use of emergency powers is a last resort option for dealing with the effects of the most serious emergencies only where existing powers prove insufficient and use of the powers is judged by the Government as necessary and proportionate.

6.5 How this principle applies to a particular scenario will depend on the particular features of that scenario. As a result, it is not possible to determine in advance of a particular incident precisely what emergency regulations might contain, and significant further work would be needed before emergency regulations could be enacted.

6.6 Emergency regulations must also be used in compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998. Requiring a person to leave a particular area (other than their home) or stay in a particular area (eg because of concerns about secondary contamination) would be unlikely to constitute a breach of their Convention rights. However, using force to do so would generally involve deprivation of liberty. This deprivation would be justified only if force were a necessary and proportionate way to enforce a lawful requirement to leave or stay and the force and length of restraint were no more than necessary. Using emergency powers to enforce evacuation from an individual’s home would also be a breach of Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (right to respect for private and family life) as would any use of force to effect the evacuation, unless it could be shown that evacuation was necessary and proportionate in the circumstances. Similarly, forcible evacuation from the home may interfere with an individual’s rights to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.

85 Terrorism Act 2000, section 33.
87 In relation to Hurricane Katrina.
88 These could include: Road Traffic Regulations Act 1984, section 67, which gives police power to close roads in an emergency for up to seven days, Terrorism Act 2000, section 36, which gives police and Community Safety Officers power to close roads in relation to a suspected terrorist-related incident, and Highways Act 1980, section 174, which allows local authorities to close roads at short notice for emergency utility works.
89 Further information is provided in Emergency Response and Recovery, Chapter 13.
**Local Authority powers to provide temporary shelter**

6.7 Local authorities have general powers to provide temporary shelter in the form of rest centres for people who have been temporarily evacuated from their homes because of an emergency.90

**Homelessness legislation**

6.8 Homelessness legislation gives local housing authorities in England and Wales duties to assist people who are homeless or likely to become homeless and who apply to the local housing authority for assistance. A person is deemed by the Housing Act 1996 to be threatened with homelessness if it is likely they will become homeless within 28 days.91 These provisions will apply where authorities need to meet the accommodation needs of people made homeless by an emergency, beyond the need for very short-term temporary evacuation.92

6.9 Housing authorities must secure suitable accommodation for eligible applicants who are unintentionally homeless and who fall within a priority need group. The latter includes applicants who are homeless as a result of an emergency such as flood, fire or other disaster.93

6.10 Local housing authorities also have the power to ask another authority to help them carry out their homelessness functions. This could, for example, enable a local authority in an affected area to provide homelessness assistance for its own residents by arranging for another local authority to provide accommodation for them or in consultation with them.

6.11 Where a local housing authority has accepted a duty to provide accommodation for someone under homelessness legislation and it has reason to believe that there is a danger of loss of, or damage to, the applicant’s personal property because the applicant is unable to protect it – and no other suitable arrangements have been made (eg private security) – the authority must take reasonable steps to prevent such loss, or prevent or mitigate any damage to the property.

**Crime prevention responsibilities**

6.12 The police have a general duty to prevent crime. As paragraph 5.6 makes clear however, evacuation planners should not rely on the police having sufficient resources to protect property made vacant by evacuation, or to deal with a large influx of displaced persons. Planners should consider developing a multi-agency crime prevention strategy involving, for example, the police, local authority and the private sector.

**The Children and Education Acts**

6.13 Local authorities and other local organisations including schools, prisons, NHS bodies and the police have duties arising from the Education Act 2002 and Children Act 2004 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. Statutory guidance documents have been published which set out how these duties are to be implemented.94 Local organisations have a considerable amount of flexibility in implementing these duties. In the context of an evacuation, plans should ensure that children are safeguarded and their welfare is promoted.

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90 The Local Government Act (LGA) 1972, section 138, enables local authorities to incur ‘such expenditure as they consider necessary in taking action themselves [sic] which is calculated to avert, alleviate or eradicate in their area or among its inhabitants, the effects or potential effects of the emergency or disaster’. The ‘well-being power’ under the LGA 2000, section 2, may also be applicable.


92 Emergency Response and Recovery, paragraph 5.17.

93 Some categories of persons from abroad are ineligible for homelessness assistance under the Housing Act 1996 (sections 183, 185 and 186) although other powers may be available to an authority to provide assistance for them (see paragraph 3.40 of this guidance).

**Animal-related responsibilities**

**6.14** Evacuation and shelter planning should address animal welfare issues in order to seek to minimise suffering and to assist owners to comply with evacuation instructions. However, in an evacuation it may be necessary to put, or leave, an animal in a position where it could suffer. Where there is the time or opportunity to relieve suffering (before or after an evacuation) this should be done as soon as reasonably possible. The key piece of legislation which defines general animal welfare responsibilities is the Protection of Animals Act 1911 which contains a general prohibition on causing animals ‘unnecessary suffering’ (either by act or omission). In deciding what constitutes ‘unnecessary suffering’ a court of law would have regard to the implications of an emergency situation in determining ‘necessity’.

**6.15** It may be necessary to euthanase animals, including livestock, to prevent further suffering. This is likely to be the case in the event of widespread CBRN contamination (see paragraph 3.35 for further information). Ideally, this would be done by a veterinary surgeon or a licensed slaughterer at the request of the owner. The Protection of Animals Act 1911 authorises a police constable to make the decision to destroy an animal if it is not reasonably practical to wait for a veterinary surgeon. The RSPCA may also be able to assist. Ordinary rules relating to the slaughter of livestock do not apply where the animal has to be killed in an emergency, nor do the restrictions on killing wild or endangered animals. An owner may euthanase their own animal where they are competent to do so. The decision to euthanase an animal may be taken in the absence of the owner’s consent if undue suffering would otherwise be caused to the animal. The vet, inspector or constable is not liable for damages from the owner if s/he reasonably believes the animal is suffering and the condition of the animal is such that it should in its own interests be destroyed.

**6.16** In addition to general animal welfare duties there are two areas which are subject to more specific legislation which emergency planners need to take into account when planning for evacuation:

**Livestock**: Farmed livestock is subject to the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1968 and its related secondary legislation. This makes it an offence to cause or allow any unnecessary pain or distress to farmed animals on agricultural land and requires owners and keepers to take all reasonable steps to ensure the welfare of such animals. The local Animal Health Office of the State Veterinary Service can be contacted for advice on the welfare of farmed animals.

**Zoos**: The Zoo Licensing Act 1981 provides for a local authority-run licensing and inspection regime for all zoos. The Act includes a broad requirement for zoos to put in place measures to be taken in the event of any escape of animals but does not include specific provisions or duties relating to major incidents or emergencies. Therefore decisions should be taken on the basis of individual circumstances and local advice.

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95 Additionally the Animal Welfare Bill, once it becomes law, is likely to impose a duty on those responsible for animals to take reasonable steps to ensure the welfare needs of their animals are met. Emergency circumstances would be taken into account in determining whether the duty to take reasonable steps had been met.

96 General advice may be obtained from the Defra Helpline (08459 335577), as well as existing local authority contacts and the RSPCA.


98 Protection of Animals Act 1911, sections 11 and 12.


100 Contact details for local Animal Health Divisional Officers can be found at: [www.svs.gov.uk/contact/ahdo_locations.htm](http://www.svs.gov.uk/contact/ahdo_locations.htm). The RSPCA is also available for advice and practical assistance.
of what is the best option in each circumstance. Zoos also have a duty (under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981) to prevent the release of any non-native species that they may house and this makes them a special case in an emergency. Zoos should therefore be engaged as part of the evacuation planning process. Defra guidance indicates that zoos should have assessed the danger to the public in the event of any escapes and that there should be a member of staff readily available at all times to take decisions on recapture or euthanasia in the event of escapes. Zoos should therefore have responsible people available to react quickly in the event of a major incident threatening the welfare of their animals or potentially threatening that some animals could escape.101

**Employment legislation**

**6.17** Health and safety at work legislation, which is based on the twin concepts of risk assessment and ‘reasonable practicability’, requires employers and others to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, a safe place of work and working practices. There is no expressed exemption in health and safety legislation for terrorist activities or for emergencies in general, rather the legislation is sufficiently flexible to adapt to the prevailing circumstances of an emergency. What is ‘reasonably practicable’ in the challenging circumstances of an emergency will, clearly, be different to what is reasonably practicable on a day-to-day basis. As a result, there should be no need to waive health and safety legislation during an emergency. Responding agencies should apply their training, knowledge and skills in assessing the circumstances they face and to take appropriate precautions. In most cases this will be to apply their established systems of work and use their usual equipment including personal protective equipment. Some circumstances may require more detailed assessment (eg before the emergency services can safely enter a badly contaminated or unstable building).

6.18 Given the challenging nature of emergency response work, responding agencies should put shift rotas in place to enable the continuing health, safety and effectiveness of personnel. However, legislation on ‘working time’ is not a bar to the emergency services or others responding to an emergency effectively. Given the way in which working time is calculated (eg the 48 hour limit is calculated by averaging time worked over 17 weeks) relatively long periods of long hours can be accommodated. There are also a number of exceptions which will apply to those dealing with emergencies, depending on the circumstances.102

6.19 Health and safety regulations also require every employer to undertake risk assessments and establish appropriate procedures to be followed in response to a disruptive event such as flooding or terrorist attack. For many risks part of the response will include evacuation. As such, most if not all employers should have developed, tested and reviewed evacuation plans.

6.20 Volunteers who are not paid are not ‘at work’ within the terms of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974. However, employers and self-employed persons still have a duty to ensure that the health and safety of volunteers is not put at risk from the employer’s activities so far as is reasonably practicable.

101 The zoos industry’s professional body the British and Irish Association of Zoos and Aquariums (BIAZA, tel: 020 7449 6351, www.biaza.org.uk) may be able to provide additional advice.

Site-specific evacuations

6.21 For industrial sites where major hazards could give rise to a need to evacuate, site-specific evacuation is required under the various regulatory regimes in place. The three main regulatory regimes are the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations (COMAH) 2005, Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 and the Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations (REPPIR) 2001.103

6.22 In addition to these regulatory regimes, as part of employer’s duty of care to ensure all building users can evacuate a building in the event of emergency, they should have developed and tested evacuation plans in place. The Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 and the Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987 govern the safety of spectators who visit sports grounds for sports and other events (like pop concerts). These set out local authority responsibilities in relation to the inspection of sports venues, including emergency evacuation procedures.104 The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 also requires that those who will have difficulty evacuating a building (eg those with mobility impairments) have a ‘Personal Emergency Evacuation Plan’.105 The Disability Discrimination Act 2005 is also relevant as it requires the public sector to actively promote disability equality.106

Collecting and sharing personal data

6.23 The collection and sharing of personal data is a key element of emergency planning and response. For evacuation planners, the collection and sharing of lists of vulnerable people to inform evacuation and sheltering plans is essential. A range of vulnerable groups and those who may hold information on them is at Annex 3A. It is important that the agencies and organisations involved in evacuation planning establish consistent processes to ensure that the disclosure or exchange of personal information is managed appropriately. Emergency planners can maintain databases of groups/establishments of vulnerable people (which can be entered into GIS systems for ready access) with more detailed information about vulnerable individuals being sought from data owners at the time of the emergency. Whilst there is substantial guidance on data protection available,107 there is some evidence that planners and responders may in the past (including in response to the 7 July 2005 bombings)108 have misinterpreted the Data Protection Act 1998.109 The following points should be considered:

- The statute which governs sharing of personal data is the Data Protection Act 1998.
Clear legal power to share data between responders is found in secondary legislation made under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

Under the Data Protection Act 1998, consent of the data subject is not a necessary precondition for lawful data sharing.

If personal data is collected by one organisation for a particular purpose it does not mean that it can only be used by another if the purpose of that other organisation is compatible with the original purpose. In fact, the legislation says that the data may not be shared if the new purpose is ‘incompatible’.

**Maritime safety regulations**

6.24 There are a variety of safety regulations and codes of practice covering pleasure craft, fishing and merchant vessels:

- Regulated vessels subject to Merchant Shipping legislation (itself based on international regulations), such as merchant ships (including passenger ships of all kinds) and the larger fishing vessels, are required to undertake emergency planning. This includes evacuation from the vessel.

- Small domestic commercial craft may be operated under one of a number of codes of practice which make certain provisions for emergency preparedness including evacuation from the vessel.

- There is no regulatory requirement on non-commercial pleasure boats for evacuation planning.

6.25 Offshore structures, such as those in the oil and gas industry, are also subject to health and safety requirements.

**Finance**

6.26 The Bellwin Scheme operates under Section 155(2) of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989, allowing Ministers to make additional revenue support available to local authorities to assist with certain immediate and unforeseen costs in dealing with the aftermath of emergency incidents.\(^{110}\) The Bellwin Scheme in Wales is devolved to the WAG. The scheme is discretionary. It exists to give special financial assistance to local authorities who would otherwise be faced with an undue financial burden as a result of taking immediate action to safeguard the life or property of, or to prevent severe inconvenience to, inhabitants of the local authority area. However, local authorities are expected to have funds in place to deal with emergencies. Accordingly, grants are paid only after the authority has spent 0.2% of its revenue budget on eligible works in the financial year. Once this threshold has been met, grants may cover 85% of eligible expenditure. There is no automatic entitlement to assistance – Ministers are empowered to decide whether or not to activate a scheme after considering the circumstances of each individual case.

6.27 The Bellwin Scheme is unlikely to be applicable to terrorist incidents. This is because the government makes separate provision for terrorist incidents. As a consequence the Bellwin Scheme did not, for example, apply to the costs of clearing up after the 1996 Docklands and Manchester Bombs.

6.28 The use of Special Requisition/Purchase Order forms during a crisis (and setting up dedicated cost codes within organisations) should be planned for, so that cost recovery from insurance companies and other emergency grant schemes has a clear audit trail.

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\(^{110}\) See the DCLG website for further information on local government finance: [www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk).
Insurance

6.29 It is the responsibility of land owners and occupiers to ensure adequate insurance cover to meet the cost of dealing with the consequences of an emergency (including terrorist incidents). As part of their business continuity duty (under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004), local authorities should emphasise to local businesses the importance of securing appropriate insurance cover. In some cases where insurers are less willing to cover the risk to private property (ie for some CBRN risks and for terrorist risks), commercial property can be covered by the Pool Re scheme set up by the insurance industry and underwritten by HM Treasury. In the public sector, central and local government bears its own risk.

\[111\] See the Business continuity and Valuables sections – paragraphs 3.27–3.29.

\[112\] See: www.hm-treasury.gov.uk.
**ANNEX 2A**

Classifying different scales of evacuation activity

2A.1 As this guidance makes clear, planners should focus on developing flexible plans for evacuation and shelter that can be scaled up or joined together with adjacent plans to evacuate larger areas or populations. Planners may find the following scales of evacuation and sheltering activity helpful – they are not meant to be prescriptive. While the term ‘mass evacuation’ is used in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, it is not defined within the legislation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Decision to trigger taken by</th>
<th>Resources likely to be required for this magnitude</th>
<th>Likely magnitude of people affected</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small-scale/local evacuation</td>
<td>Incident controller or Bronze/Silver Commanders</td>
<td>Local responders</td>
<td>Up to 1,000</td>
<td>One or two streets evacuated as a result of major gas leak or small site-specific evacuation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-scale evacuation</td>
<td>Multi-agency Gold or Silver Commanders</td>
<td>Local responders possibly with some regional/ national support</td>
<td>1,000–25,000</td>
<td>Evacuation or dispersal of parts of a city or large industrial site, evacuation due to unexploded ordnance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-scale evacuation</td>
<td>Multi-agency Gold Commander</td>
<td>Local responders with regional/ national support</td>
<td>25,000–100,000</td>
<td>Evacuation in response to major chemical release or terrorist threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass (or wide-area) evacuation</td>
<td>National/Up to Gold Commander</td>
<td>Local, regional and national</td>
<td>More than 100,000</td>
<td>Evacuation in response to very significant fluvial flooding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2A.2 The boundaries between these generic scales of evacuation are likely to be blurred. Greater numbers of people requiring evacuation does not necessarily equate to a more significant challenge for responders, especially if those people are just being dispersed.
# Annex 3A

**Organisations who can help identify those with specific needs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People with specific needs</th>
<th>Organisations and Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pupils with special educational needs/disabilities or medical needs</strong></td>
<td>LEA schools through local authorities, and non-LEA schools through their governing body or proprietor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Those dependent on medical support within hospital</strong></td>
<td>Hospitals (public, private or charitable) will have lists of their own patients who should be subject to the hospital’s own evacuation plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Those dependent on medical support (but not within hospital)</strong></td>
<td>Local health authorities, including district nurses and GPs should have visibility of this group. (GPs in particular may be able to assist with those dependant on medical support at home).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Potentially a large group encompassing not only those that need regular medical attention (eg dialysis, oxygen or a continuous supply of drugs) but those with chronic illnesses that may be exacerbated or destabilised either as a result of the evacuation or because prescription drugs were left behind.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Those that are dependent on carers or other forms of social care</strong></td>
<td>Care and nursing homes offering non-residential ‘home-visit’ care should be able to assist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This encompasses those who need assistance with basic activities such as dressing and washing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Those with a lack of understanding of what is taking place (some people with severe physical or mental disabilities, senility or mental illness)</strong></td>
<td>Social services in combination with local health authorities (mental health trusts, community psychiatric nurses) and voluntary sector and community groups (for example mental health charities) should have visibility of most of this group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Those with mobility difficulties</strong></td>
<td>Social services in combination with local health authorities, GPs, private and charitable hospitals and nursing homes and British Red Cross.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Those with sensory impairment</strong></td>
<td>Local health authorities, GPs, district nurses, voluntary sector and community groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The elderly and frail</strong></td>
<td>Those who may be able to assist include: care and nursing homes, GPs and district nurses, health visitors, and voluntary organisations providing local support to the aged (eg Help the Aged, British Red Cross).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### People with specific needs

#### Destitute asylum seekers who are not in reception/detention centres

The Home Office’s Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) run the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) which provides accommodation and subsistence through local authorities and private landlords.

#### Visitors and refugees, and non-English speaking communities

Most major emergencies have an international dimension which can present particular challenges. Foreign embassies, community centres and the immigration service should be able to assist and the Red Cross’ International Messages and Tracing Service may be of help. (Clearly, it is unlikely to be either feasible or appropriate to maintain a standing list of this group.)

#### Those dependent on state benefits

The Department for Work and Pensions is developing guidance for local authorities on benefits and qualifying conditions which may be relevant post-emergencies. Job Centre Plus should hold information on those in the area that are receiving benefits – this may also be a useful source of information on other vulnerable groups (e.g., those receiving incapacity benefit or disability allowance).

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113 This will be available in the DCMS Humanitarian Assistance guidance at [www.ukresilience.info/](http://www.ukresilience.info/).
Annex 4A
Communication and media messages

4A.1 Messages for use by responders

The following generic ‘top lines’ messages could be used by local and regional responders in the event of a major evacuation, as appropriate:

- The emergency services are responding to [details of incident].
- People in the vicinity of [details of area of shelter] have been told to stay indoors.
- People in the vicinity of [details of area of evacuation] should prepare to be evacuated [specific details of what the public should do, bring with them, and expect].
- It is essential that the public do not evacuate until told to do so.
- People in the vicinity of [details of area of evacuation] should make their way to [details of muster point].
- It is essential that the public follow the emergency services’ instructions closely.
- Further updates and information will be provided on [website/telephone helpline radio and TV].

4A.2 Messages for use by communications officers

The following generic ‘top lines’ media briefing could be used by a local or regional communications office in the event of a major evacuation:

Initial statement:
- The [insert lead responder ie police], acting with [insert other responders] are responding to a major fire/flood [or investigating an alleged threat] in x place at x time.

Update:
- An incident [describe incident] has occurred at x place at x time. As a result the [insert lead responder], with [insert other key responders] have undertaken/are undertaking an evacuation of residents/workers in the surrounding area.
- The police/fire service [insert key responders] are currently [describe action, ie tackling the fire/putting in place further flood defences/investigating the source...].
- A telephone hotline/Casualty Bureau/reception centre/assistance centre [insert/delete as appropriate and give details] has been established to provide immediate care and support to those caught up in the emergency.
4A.3 Key Web Links

Preparing for Emergencies: www.pfe.gov.uk.

UK Resilience:
www.ukresilience.info.

BBC Connecting in a Crisis:
www.bbc.co.uk/connectinginacrisis.

NSCWIP:
www.nscwip.info/.

Any relevant government departmental links
(for example, for flooding Department for the
Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)):
www.defra.gov.uk.
Annex 5A
Overview of emergency response co-ordination

5A.1 In most emergencies the police will normally co-ordinate the activities of those responding. Where the scale and geographic extent of evacuation are very substantial there will be an active role for the regional resilience tier assisting with response and recovery at the request of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG). A Regional Civil Contingences Committee (RCCC) or, in Wales, the Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC), will be set up in the event that Central or Devolved Government believes it would add value. This is particularly likely where a number of SCGs have been set up, for example in the aftermath of severe, widespread flooding. The extent of its role in an evacuation will depend on the geographic and demographic profile of the region as well as on the incident. This may include:

- facilitating mutual aid arrangements within the region and where necessary between regions;
- guiding the deployment of scarce resources across the region by identifying regional priorities;
- assessing whether there are issues that cannot be addressed locally because of their wider impacts; and
- ensuring effective flows of information between national, local and regional levels.

5A.2 The RCCC/WCCC will not interfere in local command and control arrangements unless specifically empowered to do so by emergency regulations. However, it can provide a mechanism for supporting local responders with the decisions they have to take by keeping them as well informed as possible.

5A.3 In London major evacuation arrangements are already co-ordinated at a regional level reflecting London’s circumstances as both a city and a region in its own right. The plans for large-scale evacuation of certain specific parts of London, known as Operation Sassoon, are based on the principles contained within this guidance.\(^{114}\)

5A.4 The primary role of the Regional Resilience Teams in the Government Offices will be to ensure effective communications between the national and local levels. In Wales, this function will be undertaken by the WAG.

5A.5 Subsidiarity is one of the main principles that underpin the government’s approach to emergencies. It considers that decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level with co-ordination at the highest necessary level. In the event that a Central Government response is required this will follow the principles set out in Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency – Concept of Operations whereby the arrangements will be proportionate to the scale of the incident and will follow the Lead Government Department (LGD) doctrine.\(^{115}\) This means one government

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\(^{115}\) See: www.ukresilience.info/publications/conops.pdf.
department or Devolved Administration, determined by the type of event that has given rise to the evacuation, will take overall responsibility for co-ordinating handling and presentation. In Wales, the Pan-Wales Response Plan sets out response structures and processes in the event of an emergency in or affecting Wales. Individual departments and Devolved Administrations remain responsible for their policy areas. So, for example, for a terrorist incident the LGD would be the Home Office and for flooding it would be Defra. The WAG would lead on devolved responsibilities in Wales. An up to date list of lead government departments is maintained at www.ukresilience.info.

5A.6 There is no designated LGD for evacuation as this is part of a response to a wider incident. Departments lead on their respective policy areas. For example, general transport policy (keeping the trains running and the roads as clear as possible) would be the Department for Transport and temporary housing would be the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).

5A.7 The Armed Forces would be called upon only as a last resort. Responding agencies should not base plans upon assumptions of military assistance as the Armed Forces maintain no standing forces for providing Military Aid to the Civil Authority, and hence cannot make a commitment in advance that guarantees assistance to meet specific emergencies. Nonetheless, locally or regionally based military personnel may be able to add value to the planning process and should be involved appropriately.116

116 More detail on the arrangements to provide a structured response to emergencies are set out in Emergency Response and Recovery, Chapters 3 and 8.
The following provides a generic skeleton structure of an evacuation plan:

Control Version of the Plan (dated)
Classification (eg confidential)

Overview
• Purpose of the plan
• Scope of the plan
• Key principles of the plan

Responsibilities
• Roles and responsibilities of key players
  • Police
  • Local authority
  • Fire and Rescue Service
  • Transport (eg bus, rail, air, taxi)
  • Environment Agency (for floods)
  • Media
  • Business
  • Alerting systems
  • Evacuation zones (where appropriate)
• Assembly points
• Shelter and refreshment
• Exercising, plan maintenance and training

Action
• Police command and control
• The evacuation process in detail, who does what, when, on whose instruction
• Schematic plan of the evacuation process

Decision to return
All Clear
• Sending out all-clear messages

Return and Recovery
• Roles and responsibilities

Annexes
• Key contacts (including numbers)
• Distribution List
• Maps
Annex 5C
Generic flowchart of evacuation process

This flowchart provides an overview of the processes, roles and responsibilities in an evacuation:

- **POLICE/FIRE or other responder/building operator**
  - Liaise with Category 1 & 2 responders
  - Determine need to evacuate & area to be evacuated or need to, and extent of, shelter (with local authorities/agencies etc)
  - Set up operations room
  - Send public messages
  - Initialise evacuation and clear area
  - Set up cordons and road closures

- **MET OFFICE**
  - Alert

- **ENVIRONMENT AGENCY**
  - Return and recovery

- **POLICE/FIRE/OTHER RESPONDER CONTROL OF INCIDENT**
  - Implement communications and alerting procedures
  - Implement emergency plans
  - Liaise with key partners

- **CATEGORY 1 & 2 RESPONDERS**
  - Implement communications procedures
  - Implement emergency plans
  - Liaise police/agencies
  - Activate voluntary organisations
  - Arrange to evacuate schools and vulnerable groups
  - Arrange transport as requested
  - Activate traffic management

- **LOCAL AUTHORITY**
  - Implement communications procedures
  - Activate rest centres
  - Scope evacuation requirements/implications
  - Alert schools/vulnerable groups
  - Stand by transport plans

- **VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS**
  - Implement communications procedures
  - Activate evacuation/shelter plans
  - Media Liaison Officer/GNN implement appropriate communications procedures
  - Media Liaison Officer/GNN ready
  - Responder press officers

- **MEDIA**
  - Activate emergency procedures
  - Media Liaison Office/GNN implement appropriate communications procedures

- **BUSINESSES**
  - Implement communications procedures
  - Activate traffic management
  - Stand by rest centres
  - Scope evacuation requirements/implications
  - Alert schools/vulnerable groups
  - Stand by transport plans

- **RETURN AND RECOVERY**
  - Activate emergency procedures
  - Liaise with police/agencies
  - Liaise voluntary organisations
  - Stand by rest centres
  - Scope evacuation requirements/implications
  - Alert schools/vulnerable groups
  - Stand by transport plans

Assess when safe to lift evacuation/shelter advice (lead responder in consultation with key stakeholders)

- **ALL CLEAR**
  - Communicate controlled dispersal/return. Resume normal operations (if possible). Facilitate monitored return (if possible). Recovery commences.
Glossary

Extensive glossaries are provided in the Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response and Recovery guidance.

**CBRN**
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear.

**Dispersal**
A form of evacuation in which people are simply directed to move away from a particular location without the need for temporary accommodation.

**Evacuation**
Removal of people, and where appropriate other living creatures, away from an actual or potential place of danger to a safer place.

**GIS**
GIS provides a set of tools for capturing, storing, checking, integrating, manipulating, analysing and displaying data related to positions on the Earth’s surface. Usually they are computer-based, and they can be used to aid emergency planning, as well as decision-making during an emergency.

**Large-scale evacuation**
Evacuation of up to tens of thousands of people. These should be the focus of multi-agency emergency planning given they are the ‘reasonable worse case’.

**Mass evacuation**
Evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people. There are very few scenarios in which this would be required. In evacuation planning the focus should be on flexible generic evacuation planning that can either operate on a smaller scale or be scaled up to this level from lower-level evacuation plans.

**Shelter**
Taking refuge or cover from an actual or perceived danger.

**Shelter in situ**
Sometimes known as ‘shelter-in-place’. Situation where the safest place to take refuge or cover from an actual or perceived danger is the person’s current location such as their own home, business place or school. This equates to the ‘go in, stay in, and tune in’ advice developed by the independent National Steering Committee on Warning and Informing the Public as being the best general advice to give people caught up in most emergencies.117

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117 See: www.pfe.gov.uk.
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Evacuation and Shelter Guidance

Non-statutory guidance to complement *Emergency Preparedness* and *Emergency Response & Recovery*